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HOT CRIMES: A STUDY IN EXCESS
STEVEN GROSSMANt

Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods
of moral panic. . . . [IJts nature is presented in a stylized and
stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades
are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other rightthinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their
diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more
often) restored to; ... sometimes the panic passes over and is
forgotten . .. at other times it has more serious and long-lasting repercussions and might produce such as those in legal
and social policy or even in the way society conceives itself 1
1.

INTRODUCTION

In the fall of 1984, after a jury acquitted two parents she had accused of sexually molesting their children and before she was forced to
drop charges against the twenty-one remaining defendants she had
accused of child sex abuse related charges, the chief prosecutor in Jordan, Minnesota said that she was "sick to death of things like the presumption of innocence."2 After the tragic mass murders at Columbine
High School in 1999, Mothers Against Drunk Driving ("MADD") issued a press release classifying the "murders as 'insignificant' compared to those killed in alcohol-related traffic accidents."3
What do these two announcements have in common? This Article
suggests that each is but one manifestation of the pathology that exists regarding certain crimes and the reaction to them on the part of
the public, the media, legislative bodies, law enforcement authorities,
and ultimately members ofthe judicial system. For a long time, crimes
such as these were either not treated with the seriousness they deserve (i.e. drunk driving) or the extent of their prevalence in society
was significantly underestimated (i.e. child sex abuse). Fortunately, in
ways this Article discusses, the previous undervaluation or under apt The author, a former New York City prosecutor, is the Dean Julius Isaacson
Professor of Law at the University of Baltimore School of Law. He wishes to thank
Chris Trumpower and especially Justin Fine and Ashley Marucci for their thoroughness
and dedication to this project.
1. STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS: THE CREATION OF MODS AND
ROCKERS 9 (MacGibbon & Kee eds. 1972).
2. Civia Tamarkin, Kathleen Morris, PEOPLE, Dec. 24, 1984, http://www.people.
com/people!articleJO,,20089593,OO.html.
3. David J. Hanson, Mothers Against Drunk Driving: A Crash Course in MADD,
ALCOHOL ABUSE PREVENTION, http://alcoholfacts.org/CrashCourseOnMADD.html (last
visited Oct. 2, 2011).
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preciation of these crimes was brought to the attention of different
elements of American society, and people were educated about the nature of these crimes and the degree of harm they cause. AB a result of
this heightened attention, the public and particularly victims' rights
groups began to call for more action in preventing and punishing these
crimes. Legislatures on both the state and federal levels responded to
these calls with new laws designed to accomplish both goals. Prosecutors investigated these crimes with more urgency and charged and
prosecuted them more strictly. Judges began to sentence individuals
convicted of these offenses more harshly. In other words, each affected
group in society took action in an appropriate way to deal with the
dangers that child sex abusers and drunk drivers posed.
There came a point, however, when reaction turned into over-reaction and remedial measures became excessive. This Article examines some of that over-reaction, seeks to explain why it occurs with
certain crimes, fleshes out the lessons to be learned from the overreactions, and offers suggestions on how to avoid recurrences of this
type of social pathology. For the most part, this Article uses those
crimes related to the serious problems that child sex abusers and
drunk drivers pose as illustrations of how crimes become hot crimes
and then how such crimes are treated.
Section II of this Article discusses the genesis of a hot crime, what
factors appear to be needed for a crime to become hot, and how each
factor contributes to the way in which such crimes are ultimately
treated. Section III looks at the types of excesses that hot crimes
breed. Section IV examines the kind of flaws in society's responses to
hot crimes that breed these excesses. Section V discusses how the concept that has been referred to as moral panic explains the hot crimes
phenomenon. Lastly, Section VI explores ways in which society, particularly law enforcement and legal institutions, can respond to serious crimes without the need to react with excessive and arguably
unconstitutional measures.
II. THE GENESIS OF HOT CRIMES
On October 23, 1976, a man who was thrown out of a Bronx, New
York social club after having an argument with his girlfriend returned
to the club and threw a firebomb into the club. The result was an arson fire that killed twenty-five people. 4 One year later on October 12,
1977, during the television broadcast of the second game of the World
4. Joe Conason & Jack Newfield, Arson for Hire: The Men Who are Burning New
York, VILLAGE VorCE, June 2, 1980, at 15-19; Gulliver's Discotheque Fire, New York,
HAVOC BUILDING CONTROL FIRE SAFETY, http://www.iklimnet.com/hotelfireslclubfire
case7.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2011).
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Series from Yankee Stadium, a fire started in an abandoned public
school building a few blocks away from the stadium. The fire obviously
made for dramatic television, as the camera from an ABC helicopter
lingered on the view of the school burning. Legendary sports broadcaster Howard Cosell, who was announcing the game for ABC Sports,
looked at the fire and said, "There it is, ladies and gentlemen, the
Bronx is burning."5
Prior to the game and Cosell's words, the Bronx had been suffering from a rash of arson fires, especially in decaying areas of this New
York City borough. 6 While some were acts of deliberate violence like
the social club fire, the vast majority were believed to be either randomly set or the product of attempts by landlords to get damage
awards from insurance companies for what were becoming worthless
properties. 7 Cosell's comment was an example of the growing attention that the media was paying to the arsons and the reactions to
them.
The legal community was reacting to the escalating arson fires as
well. State legislatures in the region passed laws making the arson
fires far more serious crimes. s Perhaps more significantly, politicians,
prosecutors, and judges, especially those in the Bronx, handled arson
fires, even ones in which no one was hurt, far differently than they
had in the past. 9 Crimes such as rape, armed robbery, and even some
homicides, long viewed as among the most serious of crimes, became
secondary to arson. Arson quickly received the most attention and the
heaviest sentences. In other words, arson had become a hot crime. 10
Although in 1970's New York the number of arson fires seemed to
increase, there was nothing new about fires being set for deliberate
reasons. The amount of attention arson fires received during this time
period had to do with more than just an increase in the frequency of
such crimes. Where no injuries resulted from fires, arson had always
5. 1977 World Series, BASEBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www.baseball-reference.
com/bullpen/1977 _World_Series (last visited Sept. 21, 2011).
6. Leslie Maitland, Arson Destroying New York Housing at a Record Rate, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 10, 1980, at AI.
7. Conason & Newfield, supra note 4, at 15-19.
8. See Robert E. Tomasson, Drive to Combat Arson in State Reported Gaining,
N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1981, at 11.
9. See Maitland, supra note 6, at Al (quoting then-New York City Mayor Edward
Koch as saying, "Those who commit arson are the most despicable people in the world,
and if apprehended should be sent away for forever."); see also Howard Blum, Arson in
New York: The Landlords and Their "Torches," N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1980, at AI;
Conason & Newfield, supra note 4; Leslie Maitland, Suspicious Fires Found to Have
Patterns in City, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1980, at AI.
10. For instance, the New York Times did a three-part expose on the rash of New
York City fires. See Maitland, supra note 6, at AI; Blum, supra note 9, at AI; Maitland,
supra note 9, at AI.
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been viewed, prosecuted, and punished as a property crime. In the
1970s, the media, the public, legislators, prosecutors, and judges began to understand that arson fires, even where no injuries resulted,
should be viewed as much more than just crimes against property.ll
The crime of arson, until the late 1970s, was not treated with the seriousness it deserved. The 1980's equivalent of arson, in this regard,
was the crime of drunk driving.
A.

DRUNK DRIVING

"[B]ooze had to go when ... the motor car came in."
- Henry Ford. 12
America has always been fascinated with the automobile. 13 Cars
provide a relatively fast way to get from place to place and give us the
freedom of movement on which we have come to depend. When Europe
was relying on vast rail systems and other means of public transportation after World War II, America was constructing the Eisenhower Interstate System. Many believe that modern America has inadequate
means of public transportation to satisfy our needs, but our system of
roads and highways is considered extensive and relatively complete.
The primary problem with our roadways is that over-reliance on automobiles in the United States creates congestion. 14
In the 1960s and 70s, the United States experienced an alarming
increase in the rate of driving-related fatalities, and understandably
people became concerned about the dangerous driving that caused
these accidents. 15 While it was no secret at that time that a significant
number of these accidents were caused by drivers who had been drinking alcohol, the drunk driving laws were enforced in a manner that
was lax, inconsistent, and unresponsive. 16
Several reasons for this lack of effective enforcement of the drunk
driving laws existed. First, it was difficult to fully understand the
problem because both effective field research is difficult to conduct
and research into drunk driving did not begin in earnest until after
the drunk driving problem was "federalized."17 Second, the law enforcement community did not consider drunk driving a "real crime."
For example, until the 1990s, the FBI did not even include drunk driving related crimes in the national crime database. 18 Lastly, drunk
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

See Conason & Newfield, supra note 4.
JAMES

B.

JACOBS, DRUNK DRIVING:

[d.
[d.
[d.

16. [d. at xv, xvi.
17. [d. at xix, xx.
18. [d. at xx.

AN

AMERICAN DILEMMA

xiv (1989).
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driving may simply not conform to social, historical, or political expectations of a crime in the way murder, theft, or terrorism might. 19
In 1910, New York became the first jurisdiction in the United
States to adopt laws against drunk driving. 2o Early laws prohibited
driving while intoxicated, but the necessary proof of intoxication was
hard to come by because chemical tests for blood alcohol content
("BAC") were not yet invented. 21 Once BAC tests were created, and
law enforcement was required to use them, the American Medical Association recommended, and early laws adopted a BAC standard: The
law presumed that drivers with a .15% BAC or higher were under the
influence, drivers with less than .05% were not, and drivers with a
BAC in between could be found to be under the influence if corroborating circumstances were present. 22
In many ways, the BAC23 standard is arbitrary24: a BAC of .10%
is the level where "approximately half of the population will show
signs of intoxication."25 While a .04% BAC is "not inconsistent with
safe driving," the likelihood of a vehicle accident increases dramatically at .08%.26 Although arbitrary, the BAC standard is objective,
and anti-drunk-driving advocacy groups soon began pressuring
lawmakers to set a lower BAC standard for intoxicated driving. 27
In the 1960s, fueled by several court decisions and the writings of
doctors and other experts, alcoholism came to be regarded as more of a
disease than a crime. 28 Alcoholics are people who either physically or
psychologically cannot resist drinking liquor. To imprison such people
19. [d. at xxi.
20. [d. at xiv.
21. H. LAURENCE Ross, CONFRONTING DRUNK DRIVERS: SOCIAL POLICY FOR SAVING
LIVES 42-43 (1992).
22. [d. at 43.
23. JACOBS, supra note 12, at 70 ("BAC, measured in terms of the weight of the
quantity of alcohol in a given volume of blood, expresses the ratio of weight to volume
(or breath), in terms of a percentage.").
24. [d. at 70-71.
25. [d. at 71 (referencing a 1970 American Medical Association Committee on
Medicolegal Problems study).
26. [d. at 71 (referencing Professor Borkenstein's classic Grand Rapids Study).
27. See Craig Reinarman, The Social Construction of an Alcohol Problem: The Case
Against Mothers Against Drunk Drivers and Social Control in the 1980s, 17 THEORY &
SOC'y 91, 98-99, 105-{)6 (1988).
28. See Public Health Service Amendments of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-574, 82 Stat.
105; Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Driver v. Hinnant, 356
F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966); see also ELVIN JELLINEK, THE DISEASE CONCEPI' OF ALCOHOLISM (1960). In his book, Jellinek
described alcoholics as individuals with tolerance, withdrawal symptoms, and
either "loss of control" or "inability to abstain" from alcohol. He asserted that
these individuals could not drink in moderation, and, with continued drinking,
the disease was progressive and life-threatening. Jellinek also recognized that
some features of the disease (e.g., inability to abstain and loss of control) were
shaped by cultural factors.
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was regarded as cruel and unhelpful. During the five years from 1969
to 1974, the number of arrests for public drunkenness in the United
States fell from two million to one million. 29 This huge decrease was
both a cause of and a reaction to the lenient treatment alcohol-related
crimes received in the courts. In many states, drunk driving was only
a hybrid crime. That is, the crime was viewed as a combination of
being drunk and driving recklessly. 30
Furthermore, judges were not trained in how to deal with drunk
drivers. There was no line to guide them with respect to when mere
carelessness became harmful behavior. Judges, therefore, were left
largely to their own devices in deciding how to treat alcohol related
driving crimes. 31 It was inevitable then that the subjective views that
judges had towards drunk drivers would playa significant, even determinative role, in how driving related alcohol crimes were sentenced. Such subjective views were, no doubt, formed in large part by
each sentencing judge's unique experiences and values.
Given the socioeconomic group from which they come, most state
judges are considerably more likely to sympathize and even empathize
with a drunk driver than they are with most other types of
criminals. 32 This was especially true before the 1980s and 90s when
drunk driving became a hot crime. A judge might know a burglar, an
armed robber, or a rapist outside his or her professional life, but the
chances are not great. It is even less likely that the judge ever committed the crime himself. It is very likely, however, that the judge knew
people who perhaps had a drink or two too many during a dinner
meeting or a holiday celebration and then drove home. 33 It would not
stretch the imagination too far to believe that perhaps the judge had
done so him or herself. 34 Judges are more likely to empathize with
Thomas R. Hobbs, Ph.D., Managing Alcoholism as a Disease, PHYSICIAN'S NEWS DIGEST,
Feb. 1998, http://www.physiciansnews.com/commentary/298wp.html; see also Robinson
v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (referring to drug addiction, often compared to alcoholism, as an illness).
29. JACOBS, supra note 12, at 12; see also David Robertson Jr., Powell v. Texas: The
Case orthe Intoxicated Shoeshine Man Some Reflections a Generation Later by a Participant, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 401, 441 (1999) (quoting the 1967 President's Crime Commission Report as stating, "[In] 1965 there were two million public drunkenness arrests in
America, for the year 1996, the number of reported arrests had fallen to less than
465,000 for people over eighteen.").
30. See, e.g., Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984) (discussing how in Wisconsin,
the first offense for driving while intoxicated was a non-criminal civil forfeiture
violation).
31. Eric J. Gouvin, Note & Comment, Drunk Driving and the Alcoholic Offender: A
New Approach to an Old Problem, 12 AM. J. L. & MED. 99, 119 (1986).
32. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PuNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 281
(1983).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 282.
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those whose situations are similar to their own. How many judges,
when sentencing a drunk driver back before drunk driving came to be
regarded as seriously as it is now, thought that there but for fortune
go I? It is hardly surprising, therefore, that sentences meted out to
drunk drivers were for the most part lenient, especially where no
physical injury to others was involved.
For these reasons, drunk driving was a crime that through the
1970s was not viewed or treated as the serious crime that most have
come to regard it as today. It is time now to look into what changed
the way drunk driving is regarded in the United States. How did
drunk driving become a hot crime?
In 1980, Candi Lightner, a California real estate agent, suffered a
life-altering personal loss when a drunken hit-and-run driver killed
her thirteen-year-old daughter, Cari, as she walked down a suburban
street. 35 Lightner later wrote that, "I promised myself on the day of
Cari's death that I would fight to make this needless homicide count
for something positive in the years ahead."36 And so she did. Later
that year, Candi Lightner became the organizer and founding president of Mothers Against Drunk Driving ("MADD") whose mission was
"to aid the victims of crimes performed by individuals driving under
the influence of alcohol or drugs, to aid the families of such victims
and to increase public awareness of the problem of drinking and
drugged driving."37 Over the years the mission of MADD has come to
include the elimination of drunk driving and the prevention of underage drinking.38
As MADD and other citizen-based anti-drunk driving organizations insinuated their way more and more into the public consciousness, lawmakers began to respond to the growing call to do something
about drunk driving accidents. For example, Senator Frank
Lautenberg became concerned that although the minimum drinking
age in his state of New Jersey was twenty-one, many under that age
were crossing the Hudson River and purchasing liquor in N ew York
where the minimum age was eighteen. 39 With the avid support of
35. Laurie Davies, 25 Years of Saving Lives, MADD (Fall 2005), http://www.madd.
org/aboutus/bistory/madd25thhistory. pdf.
36. Candy Lightner, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilCandy_Lightner (last
visited Mar. 12, 2011).
37. History of the Mission Statement, MADD (2011), http://www.madd.org/aboutus/mission!.
38. Id. Other organizations with missions similar to MADD were forming as well.
For example, Students Against Destructive Decisions, originally Students Against Driving Drunk, was formed in 1981 in Massachusetts. History ofSADD, SADD (2011), http:/
/www.sadd.org/history.htm.
39. See Mary Pat Treuthart, Lowering the Bar: Rethinking Underage Drinking, 9
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PuB. POL'y 303, 310 n.34 (2006).
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MADD, Senator Lautenberg proposed an amendment that later became law requiring all states within two years to raise the minimum
age for a person to purchase or possess alcoholic beverages to twentyone. 40 A state failing to do this would lose 10% of its federal highway
funds. 41
The state of South Dakota challenged the new law, citing concerns related to federalism and the overuse of Congressional authority
under the Taxing and Spending Clause of the Constitution. 42 The
U.S. Supreme Court rejected this challenge in South Dakota v. Dole,43
and within a short time, every state whose drinking age was lower
than twenty-one capitulated and complied with the new law.
B.

CHILD ABUSE

Unlike drunk driving, in modern America there has never been
any question about the seriousness of the sexual abuse of children.
What there was, however, was a misperception about its breadth and
prevalence. 44 We know now that child abuse is not that rare and occurs in all socio-economic groupS.45 In part because this was such an
uncomfortable and almost unthinkable realization, people refused to
think about it. Law enforcement officers, relatives, friends, neighbors,
teachers, medical personnel, and social workers were rarely educated
about the signs that existed indicating that a child was the victim of
sexual abuse. 46 In turn, they did not actively look for such signs except in those extremely rare cases when something was directly reported to them. 47 While children are sometimes taken and abused by
strangers, we now know that the vast majority of child sex abusers are
either members of the child's family or family friends and acquaint40. Author of21 Drinking Age Law Sen. Frank Lautenberg Celebrates the 21st. Anniversary of that Important Measure, FRANK R. LAUTENBERG (Apr. 13, 2005), http://
lautenberg.senate.gov/newsroom/record.cfm?id=254503. States also took dramatic
steps to turn the law against drunk drivers. Reinarman, supra note 27, at 105--08.
President Reagan initially opposed the law but later changed his mind because his advisors recognized the issue as a "sleeping giant." Id. at 100.
41. Id. at 99-100.
42. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
43. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
44. NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (1993) (documenting belief that child abuse in the United States was rare).
45. Id.
46. See generally Asmara Tekle-Johnson, In the Zone: Sex Offenders and the TenPercent Solutions, 94 IOWA L. REV. 607, 650 (2009).
47. See generally Roland C. Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 177,186-87 (1983).
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ances. 48 This was a major contributing factor to why the crime often
went unnoticed and why it was not reported. 49
Another factor contributing to the underreporting of child abuse
cases was the very nature of child abuse itself. 50 How much and what
forms of discipline was a parent permitted to undertake with a child
before it could be regarded as abusive behavior? On the other end of
the spectrum, how much affection was permitted before the conduct
became sexual in nature? By adding to this uncertainty the fact that
until relatively recently children in western nations were considered
the property of their parents,51 it becomes clearer still why so many
instances of child abuse never were exposed.
In the 1970s, awareness of the child abuse problem increased because of a number of factors. With the civil rights and feminist movements becoming prominent in America, and due to a number of
economic factors, far greater numbers of women began entering the
workforce during this period. 52 The last time such a phenomenon occurred was during WWII due to the absence of men needed to fill jobs
in the American economy. 53 Back then, in the midst of the wartime
spirit of help, families and friends pitched in to care for the children
while the women worked and the men fought in the war. In the 1970s
and beyond, this role was undertaken to a great degree by day care
centers. 54 The result of this was that young children were cared for in
large numbers by adults who were largely unknown to the parents.
After combining the increasing societal awareness of and sensitivity to child sex abuse, the horror with which almost everyone regarded
such crimes, and the fact that more and more children were being
cared for by relative strangers, it is clear that all that was needed for
an explosion in how child sex abuse was regarded was a match to light
the fuse of reaction. A series of multi-victim, multi-offender child
abuse prosecutions that began in the early 1980s in Bakersfield and
48. See Bela August Walker, Essay: Deciphering Risks: Sex Offender Statutes and
Moral Panic in a Risk Society, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 183, 185 (2010).
49. See Kamala London et aI., Disclosure of Child Sexual Abuse: What Does the
Research Tell Us About the Ways that Children Tell?, 11 PSYCHOL. PuB. POL'y & L. 194,
195 (2005).
50. CYNTHIA CROSSON-ToWER, UNDERSTANDING CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (1993).
51. [d.
52. See FRANCINE D. BLAU, MARIANNE A. FERBER & ANNE E. WINKLER, THE EcoNOMICS OF WOMEN, MEN, AND WORK 69 (1986).
53. See MARy P. RYAN, WOMANHOOD IN AMERICA: FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE
PRESENT 267 (1975); Thomas H. Barnard & Adrienne L. Rapp, Pregnant Employees,

Working Mothers and the Workplace - Legislation, Social Change and Where We Are
Today, 22 J.L. & HEALTH 197,201-03 (2009).
54. See Donald E. Messer & Bonnie J. Messer, Day Care: A Need Crying to Be
Heard, RELIGION-ONLINE (Nov. 6, 1974), http://www.religion-online.org/showarticie.asp?
title=1599.
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Kern County, California55 and continued through the McMartin Preschool case in 198356 lit that match. The explosion resulting from
these prosecutions was not completely extinguished until 1996 when
the convictions of the Kern County defendants were overturned. 57
In these and other such cases, the nature of the hot crimes phenomenon can be seen quite clearly. Overly eager police with the help
of overly eager "child therapy professionals" feed the results of their
efforts to crusading prosecutors who charge criminal defendants based
on evidence obtained in a highly suggestive manner58 and often not
supported by physical or other evidence. 59 Evidence that points to
any conclusion short of child abuse is either ignored or covered Up.60
The media plays up the cases in ever more horrifying ways, inciting
the public and leading to even more questionable prosecutions. 61
From such things, societal excess is born and nurtured.

III. EXCESS
Societal over-reaction to a hot crime can be shown in a variety of
ways depending largely on what group or institution is the source of
the over-reaction. Citizens groups call for extreme responses, the media describes the crimes in progressively more strident language, the
police and prosecutors rely on techniques for prevention or apprehension that do not pass the usual tests for reliability, and courts abandon
well-established principles in determining the legality of procedures
designed to combat hot crimes. In examining the approaches taken to
combat drunk driving and child sexual abuse as they became hot
crimes, one can see several of these types of over-reaction.
A.

DRUNK DRIVING

Faced with pressure from groups like Mothers Against Drunk
Driving ("MADD") and Remove Intoxicated Drivers ("RID"), law en55. See, e.g., People v. Stoll, 783 P.2d 698 (Cal. 1989); People v. Pitts, 273 Cal. Rptr.
757 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
56. John Earl, The Dark Truth About the "Dark Tunnels of McMartin," 7 INST. FOR
PSYCHOL. THERAPIES, 1995, available at http://www.ipt-forensics.com/journal/volume7/j7
_2_1.htm.
57. Maggie Jones, Who Was Abused?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2004, http://www.ny
times.com/2004l09/19/magazinelI9KIDSL.html?pagewanted=all&position=.
58. Dana D. Anderson, Note, Assessing the Reliability of Child Testimony in Sexual
Abuse Cases, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 2117, 2144-49 (1996).
59. See PHILIP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF THE CHILD MoLESTER IN MODERN AMERICA 171-72 (1998).
60. See Thomas L. Feher, The Alleged Molestation Victim, the Rules of Evidence,
and the Constitution: Should Children Really Be Seen and Not Heard?, 14 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 227, 237-38 (1987).
61. See VALERIE J. CALLANAN, FEEDING THE FEAR OF CRIME: CRIME-RELATED MEDIA
AND SUPPORT FOR THREE STRIKES 53-56 (2005).
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forcement authorities felt a greater need to apprehend drunk drivers
and to be seen doing SO.62 Traditionally, police officers arrested drunk
drivers most often by observing the manner in which the driver is operating the car. Officers would notice both the obvious signs of the
drunk driver, such as erratic driving, as well as those less obvious
ones they had been trained to observe, such as a car being driven in
cold weather with the windows wide open. 63 Usually these officers
looked for the telltale signs of drunk driving from their patrol cars
while they were either driving or parked on the sides of the road. At
times, officers positioned themselves outside certain bars and made
arrests as they saw intoxicated persons exiting the bar and starting
their cars.64
Arrests made in all of these situations generally complied with
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment as interpreted by the U.S.
Supreme Court. In 1979, the Court held in Delaware v. Prouse 65 that
in non-exceptional circumstances, before the police could pull over a
vehicle in transit, the officer must have an articulable suspicion that
the driver of the vehicle or the vehicle itself was in violation of some
law or regulation. 66 Ten years before Prouse, the Court held in the
landmark case of Terry v. Ohio67 that persons on the street could not
be subjected to investigative seizures unless there was articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. 68 In the traditional police investigative stop of a suspected drunk driver, the officer could point to
the specific reasons (those signs exhibited by the manner in which the
car was being operated) that led the officer to become suspicious. It
was the presence of these specific, suspicious signs that satisfied the
Fourth Amendment seizure requirements set forth in Terry and
Prouse. 69
Faced with the increasing awareness of the public and government officials to the danger posed by drunk drivers and the demand to
do something about the problem, some police departments began experimenting with an entirely different kind of investigative tech62. Police DUI arrests increased by more than 50%, reaching 20 million arrests in
1982. A History of the Science and Law Behind DUl, 1 TRAFFIC SAFETY CENTER, no. 3,
Summer 2003, available at http://safetrec.berkeley.edulnewsletterISummer03IDUlHistory.html; see, e.g., JENKINS, supra note 59, at 218; see also Reinarman, supra note 27, at
105-08.
63. H. Laurence Ross, Law, Science and Accidents: The British Road Safety Act of
1967, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 11 (1973).
64. JACOBS, supra note 12, at 110.
65. 440 U.S. 648, 662 (1979).
66. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662 (1979).
67. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
68. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
69. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 648.
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nique. 70 This new enforcement technique allowed the police to detain
the driver for investigation without any requirement that the police
suspected the driver of drunk driving or any other violation of the
law.71 It required stopping every car or stopping cars in some systemic, non-discriminatory manner (i.e. every third car) that passed
through a checkpoint set up by the police. Often these checkpoints
were established on roadways strategically selected because they either led away from areas that contained bars or were the scene of
many accidents. 72 Known as sobriety checkpoints, these detentions
were designed to be fairly brief but allowed the officer enough time to
talk to the driver to observe certain signs of intoxication, such as difficulty in taking out a driver's license, slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, or
the odor of alcohol on the breath. The public was told that because
many drunk drivers do not give off signs that police could detect
merely by observing driving patterns, these checkpoints would be far
more successful at apprehending drunk drivers than the traditional
means of doing so discussed above. Many of these roadblocks were set
up on weekend nights, the time that the highest number of drunk
drivers was on the roads. 73 In looking closely at the attention they
received, their lack of success in combating drunk driving, and the
manner in which courts assessed their constitutionality, sobriety
checkpoints serve as instructive analytic tools in examining what happens when a crime becomes hot.
Proposed originally as a means of apprehending drunk drivers
who posed a great danger to the walking and driving public, sobriety
checkpoints soon proved rather conclusively to be ineffective at catching drunk drivers. 74 While the statistics varied somewhat, sobriety
checkpoints fairly consistently reported that 1% or less of the drivers
passing through them were arrested for alcohol or drug related driving offenses. 75 When taking into consideration that most of these
checkpoints were set up at night and often on weekends, the time
70. See Richard A. HIt, Note, Curbing the Drunk Driver under the Fourth Amendment: The Constitutionality of Roadblock Seizures, 71 GEO. L.J. 1457, 1457 (1983).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1461-63; JACOBS, supra note 12, at 111.
73. Steven P. Grossman, Sobriety Checkpoints: Roadblocks to Fourth Amendment
Protections, 12 AM. J. CRIM. L. 123, 157 (1984).
74. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 460 n.2, 461 n.3 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Grossman, supra note 73, at 158-59, 163-64.
75. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Beaman, 880 A.2d 578, 590 (Pa. 2005) (Nigro, J.,
dissenting) ("The empirical data before our Court establishes that during the years
1999-2001, only .71 percent of all drivers stopped at suspicionless checkpoints were
charged with DUl .... "); Jack Gillum, DUI Checkpoints Costly, Catch Few, ARIZ. DAILY
STAR, Aug. 27, 2007 (stating that of the fewer than 1% of drivers stopped at sobriety
checkpoints and arrested on suspicion of DUI, half of that number were ever convicted);
Police Term Drunken-Driver Crackdown a Success, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1983, at B1.
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when the highest percentage of drivers was intoxicated, their failure
to apprehend such drivers becomes even clearer. 76 Experts believe
that roughly 7-8% of nighttime drivers are legally intoxicated. 77 This
would mean that sobriety checkpoints are arresting about one out of
every seven or eight drunk drivers who pass through them. 78
One of the largest sobriety checkpoints programs established in
the 1980s took place in New York City from May 27 through June 26,
1983. 79 These checkpoints were typical of most checkpoint operations
in that they were set up at night, mostly on weekends, when the highest percentage of drivers were believed to be drunk, and the locations
were changed daily so that drivers would not be expecting them. 80
During the month in which the checkpoints operated, 100 police officers stopped 184,828 drivers at the checkpoints. 81 Of that number,
210 were arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol or
drugs. 82 So 100 officers spent a month arresting one-eighth of the 1%
of drivers they stopped at these sobriety checkpoints, likely less than
one out of twenty of the intoxicated drivers who drove through them.
It was hardly surprising that the New York City program, like
virtually all other such sobriety checkpoint programs, failed at apprehending drunk drivers.83 Officers had a very limited time, generally
only ten to fifteen seconds, to observe drivers at these checkpoints.
This is because in order to comply with Fourth Amendment holdings
regarding suspicionless seizures, the detentions have to be brief and
relatively unintrusive. 84 Thus more comprehensive and reliable ways
of determining if one was intoxicated, such as blood or breath tests
76. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 465 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
77. RICHARD COMPTON & AMY BERNING, RESULTS OF THE 2007 NATIONAL ROADSIDE
SURVEY OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG USE BY DRIVERS (2009), available at httpJ/www.ondcp.
gov/publicationslpdfJ07roadsidesurvey.pdf. This report also notes that for the first time
in 2007, the report took into account other drugs in nighttime drivers' systems and
found that 14.4% of nighttime drivers were drug-positive. Id.
78. Id.; see also Post Details: Sobriety Checkpoint Statistics Speak for Themselves,
ROADBLOCK REVELATIONS (Feb. 23, 2007), https://www.checkpointusa.org/blog/index.
php/2007/02l23/p25 (reporting that a Pima County, Arizona sobriety checkpoint program that occurred during Labor Day Weekend 2006 had a DUI arrest rate of approximately.6%).
79. Police Term Drunken-Driver Crackdown a Success, N.Y. TIMES, June 27,1983,
at B1.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 460 n.2, 461 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
reviewed the success rate of various states' sobriety checkpoint records. He noted that
Maryland's program achieved a .3% arrest rate, Arizona had a .2% arrest rate, California had a 0% arrest rate, Indiana had a 7% arrest rate, Indiana had a 2.6% arrest rate,
Kansas had an approximate arrest rate of .6%, Massachusetts had a 1.6% arrest rate,
and New Hampshire had a .9% arrest rate. Id.
84. Grossman, supra note 73, at 159 n.197.
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were not permitted at the initial stop. Upon approaching such a checkpoint, any but the most intoxicated of drivers would surely have hid
any bottle of alcohol, perhaps popped a breath mint, and collected
himself sufficiently to pass a brief visual inspection through a car window by flashlight at night. That same driver would make it his business to drive especially carefully as he came to the checkpoint. He
would not give off the signals that trained officers could observe while
watching driving patterns from off a road or highway. When approaching such a checkpoint, it was unlikely that a driver would drive
erratically or violate traffic laws such as going through red lights,
speeding, and not driving within the traffic lane. At that time, there
would be more subtle signs that officers at checkpoints were unlikely
to observe but that trained police officers observing a driver in the
flow of traffic knew to be clues that one might be driving impaired.
Examples of such signs would be a driver who kept his window open in
cold weather or applied his directional signal well before needing to.
Faced with the failure of sobriety checkpoints to apprehend the
vast majority of drunk drivers who passed through them, the proponents of the checkpoints shifted their attention to another claimed
benefit that would derive from such inspections. 85 It was claimed that
even if relatively few drunk drivers were arrested at the checkpoints,
they would serve as effective deterrents to those people thinking of
getting in their car after imbibing too much alcohol. 86 The significance
of this deterrent effect would be to reduce the large number of serious
traffic accidents caused by drunk drivers and would be demonstrated
by reductions in accident rates in places utilizing checkpoints. Deterrence is of course difficult to prove and therefore even more difficult to
disprove. However, as with the apprehension rate discussed above,
the available data at the time and the knowledge that existed about
accidents caused by drunk driving again showed that sobriety checkpoints were ineffective. 87
Even though the claims regarding the effectiveness of sobriety
checkpoints as a deterrent to drunk driving were not borne out, proponents of the checkpoints continued making their claims anyway. For
example, the Governor of Massachusetts boasted that the sobriety
checkpoints established in his state over the Fourth of July weekend
85. See, e.g., John Feinstein, Sobriety Checkpoints, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 1982, at
B1; Doug Jewett, State Should Adopt Swedish System of Deterrence, SEATTLE TIMES,
Feb. 9, 1983, at All; Police Term Drunken·Driver Crackdown a Success, N.Y. TIMES,
June 27, 1983, at B1; Sobriety Checkpoint Drunk·Driving Roadblock Set for Harford,
BALT. SUN, Dec. 14, 1982, at Dl.
86. NATL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., SATURATION PATROLS & SOBRIETY
CHECKPOINTS 3 (2002), available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/peopielinjury/aicohoJJsaturationpatroislSatPats2002. pdf.
87. See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
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in 1983 reduced the traffic fatalities in his state to the lowest level in a
decade. ss What then accounted for the fact that during that same
weekend traffic fatalities diminished nationwide to their lowest total
in twenty-three years? Certainly it was not the few isolated checkpoints that existed around the nation at that time. It is far more likely
that the reduction could be attributed to increased awareness of the
seriousness of the drunk driving problem resulting from the efforts of
MADD and other groups, the deployment of more and better trained
police officers in patrol cars looking for signs emitted by drunk drivers, and changes in the law, such as raising the drinking age and stiffening the penalties for drunk driving. s9
The Maryland State Police also claimed that sobriety checkpoints
prevented accidents and based this conclusion on data collected over a
period of time longer than just one holiday weekend. From December
1982 to February 1983, the total number of accidents (both alcohol
and non-alcohol related) in one county using sobriety checkpoints was
reported to be 125 less than the previous year when checkpoints were
not used. 90 In a control county, the accident rates were unchanged
from the year before. 91
Although the figures for alcohol-related accidents in both counties
in fact diminished by the same 10% from the previous year, the police
maintained that these numbers showed the effectiveness of checkpoints in preventing accidents. 92 Of course, had the police looked at
the same statistics for the same period of time from 'another nearby
county of approximately the same size as the counties they reported
on, their opinion might have been different. That county reported that
both the number of fatal accidents and alcohol-related fatal accidents
were halved from the year before without using checkpoints. This reduction was achieved through the deployment of carefully trained and
strategically located police patrols looking for drivers evidencing signs
ofimpairment. 93 Additionally, the data coming from other counties offered no support for the deterrence benefit of sobriety checkpoints. 94
88. BOSTON GLOBE, July 4, 1983, at 23 col. 3 (statement of Mass. Governor).
89. In fact, traffic fatalities nationally during that 1983 Fourth of July weekend
were the lowest for any weekend in the previous twenty-three years. Id. at 23 cols. 3, 4,
5, & 6.
90. Karen Hosler, State Likely to Widen Sobriety Checkpoints, BALT. SUN, May 24,
1983, at DI.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See Beaman, 880 A.2d at 590 (Nigro, J., dissenting) (discussing statistics during 1999-2001, 7.69% of arrests made by roving patrols resulted in DUI arrests, as compared with the .71% of arrests made at sobriety checkpoints); H. LAURENCE Ross,
DETERRING THE DRINKING DRIVER: LEGAL POLICY AND SOCIAL CONTROL 66 (1984); Karina
loffee, Statistics Spark Debate on Whether DUI Checkpoints Work, RECORDNET.COM
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In addition to being less effective in terms of arresting impaired
drivers, sobriety checkpoints also consume more man hours than roving patrols. One judge took note of the fact that a DUI arrest at some
checkpoints required 28.77 man-hours, whereas a patrol required only
18.82 man-hours before a DUI arrest. 95
As with the failure of sobriety checkpoints to apprehend drunk
drivers, so too is the data showing no deterrent benefit from them
hardly surprising. Clearly, drunk drivers cause many serious accidents, and the benefit of deterring drunk driving is said to be that
doing so would significantly reduce the number of such accidents. An
examination of who these drunk drivers are and an understanding of
how deterrence works, however, makes clear why sobriety checkpoints
were not effective in reducing accidents or deterring those drivers
most likely to cause them.
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA")
has concluded that two-thirds of those who drive intoxicated are either
alcoholics or problem drinkers.96 This is particularly significant because NHTSA and other commentators consider problem drinkers and
alcoholics to be virtually incapable of being deterred from driving intoxicated. 97 As one commentator noted, "[T]he problem drinker whose
very life is subjected to his most often uncontrollable desires-perhaps
compulsion-to drink to excess will not be prevented from driving on
the roadways in an intoxicated condition by a fine ... or a jail term."98
This makes sense because the theory of crime prevention known as
deterrence requires that an individual thinking about committing a
crime weighs the advantages (the benefits either pecuniary or otherwise) against the likelihood of being apprehended and the punishment
he or she will receive if convicted. 99 The more the potential criminal
intends and plans a crime and then weighs the potential consequences
of doing so, the more deterrence is said to work as a crime preventer.
(Sept. 18, 2005), http://www.recordnet.comlapps/pbcs.dlIlarticle?AID=/20050918/NEWS
011509180321 (reporting that states that use roving patrols rather than sobriety checkpoints saw a steeper decline in alcohol-related traffic deaths).
95. Beaman, 880 A.2d at 590 (Nigro, J., dissenting).
96. NA'r'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., SUMMARY OF NATIONAL ALCOHOL
SAFETY ACTION PROJECTS 2 (1979).
97. Roger C. Cramton, The Problem of the Drinking Driver, 54 AB.A J. 995, 998
(1968); Joseph W. Little, Control of the Drinking Driver: Science Challenges Legal Creativity, 54 AB.A J. 555,557 (1968); Comment, Deterring the Drinking Driver: Treatment
v. Punishment, 7 UCLA ALAsKA L. REV. 244, 253 (1978); NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC
SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 96, at 2.
98. Marvin Wagner, Problem Drinking v. Public Safety, 7 TRIAL, no. 3, May-June
1971, at 26, 28.
99. See Roger C. Cramton, Driver Behavior and Legal Sanctions: A Study of Deterrence, 67 MICH. L. REV. 421, 438 (1969); see also Johannes Andenaes, The Effects of
Scandinavia's Drinking-and-Driving Laws: Facts and Hypotheses, 6 SCANDINAVIAN
STUD. CRIMINOLOGY 35, 46 (1978).
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Obviously, alcoholics and problem drinkers are usually less capable as
well as less inclined to weigh carefully their chances of being apprehended and the consequences of such apprehension before they get
into their cars while drunk. 1oo They are, therefore, most unlikely to
fall into the category of those likely to be deterred by potential arrest
and punishment. This is not to say that drunk drivers do not deserve
the punishments they receive (corresponding to the theory of punishment known as retribution), but only that they are unlikely to be deterred by them.
So the one-third of drunk drivers who are considered social drinkers and who cause a lower number of traffic accidents is the only
group that has any realistic potential of being deterred from driving
drunk by knowing about sobriety checkpoints. For these drivers to be
meaningfully deterred, they must believe there is a significant chance
they will be apprehended. In 1979, shortly before sobriety checkpoints
begin to appear with some frequency, it was estimated that for every
2,000 trips taken by drunk drivers, only one resulted in arrest. 101
Given their low rates of apprehension and the fact that they take traffic patrol personnel away from watching for and arresting those actually observed driving drunk, sobriety checkpoints were unlikely to
change those numbers. Therefore, unless drivers have a misconception about their realistic chances of being arrested for driving drunk,
even social drinkers who may think about the consequences of what
they are doing are not especially likely to be deterred by sobriety
checkpoints.
Given their ineffectiveness in both arresting and deterring drunk
drivers,102 why then were sobriety checkpoints championed so vigorously by anti-drunk driving interest groups and certain members of
the law enforcement community? One thing about sobriety checkpoints was undisputed. They made news. Newspapers and local television news programs frequently wrote about or showed them, being
careful not to reveal their locations. Politicians, like the Governor of
Massachusetts, could point to them as proof that they recognized the
problem and were serious about dealing with it. Interest groups had
tangible evidence that the pressure they were putting on law enforcement agencies and politicians was paying off. So what if the check100. Michael F. Lotito, Note, Unsteady on its Feet: Sobriety Checkpoint Reasonableness, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 735, 761-62 (2010) (stating that pre-problem and problem
drinkers cannot be considered rational in terms of their drinking and therefore sobriety
checkpoints have little deterrent value to these types of drinkers).
101. See Tracy Cameron, The Impact of Drinking-Driving Countermeasures: A Review and Evaluation, 8 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 495, 511 (1979); see also NAT'L HIGHWAY
SAFETY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 96, at 2; Ross, supra note 94, at 87.
102. Even police officers doubt the effectiveness of DUI checkpoints. See Sitz, 496
U.S. at 470 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Grossman, supra note 70.
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points did not help deal with the actual problem of drunk driving?
They satisfied many other needs that were particularly relevant to the
phenomena of hot crimes. In the words ofU.8. Supreme Court Justice
Stevens, "[S]obriety checkpoints are elaborate, and disquieting, publicity stunts."103
Sometimes satisfying these needs resulted merely in a waste of
time or money. Sometimes they drained resources from being used for
other efforts to deal with the drunk driving problem that were more
effective but less flashy. Additionally, sometimes they led to stretching or crossing the boundaries of the law to accommodate the enforcement program.
In 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court tackled the issue ofthe constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints. In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz,104 the Court held that although stopping a car at a
checkpoint was indeed a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, it was
a "reasonable" seizure despite the absence of the articulable suspicion
traditionally required for such seizures. 105 The Court's opinion in Sitz
is most notable for the surprising way it abandoned its previous approach to suspicionless automobile seizures 106 and its cavalier treatment of a record that, in assessing the effectiveness of sobriety
checkpoints, demonstrated that even the most charitable reading of
the record showed little indication that such checkpoints were
successful. 107
The majority in Sitz determined that the method for analyzing
the constitutionality of these checkpoint seizures involved a test derived from its holding in Brown v. Texas,108 which required a ''weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the
degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty."109 All parties
agreed the danger posed by drunk drivers was indeed a grave one, so
attention turned to the next factor: the degree to which sobriety checkpoints contribute to dealing with this danger. In a detailed analysis of
the data available from the record compiled by both parties to the law103. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 475 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[S]obriety checkpoints are elaborate, and disquieting, publicity stunts.")
104. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
105. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 449-50 (citing Treasury Employees v. Van Raab, 489 U.S. 656
•
(1989)).
106. Id. at 456-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S.
200, 209, 210 (1979)) (stating that in most cases, the police must possess probable cause
for a seizure to be judged reasonable).
107. See id. at 454-55 (admitting that "approximately 1.6 percent of the drivers
passing through the checkpoint [at issue] were arrested for alcohol impairment.").
108. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
109. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 448-50 (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979).
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suit challenging the Michigan checkpoints, the trial judge found that
sobriety checkpoints were not an effective means of combating drunk
driving. llo The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed this finding.lll
The U.S. Supreme Court appeared at first to reject even the need to
examine the effectiveness of the seizure and then seemed to defend
the effectiveness of the checkpoints, albeit in a cursory manner. 112
The Court rejected the seemingly obvious conclusion of the Michigan courts that in order for a suspicionless and therefore extraordinary seizure to "advance the public interest," it must be at least
somewhat effective in achieving its purpose.ll 3 Instead, the Court
held that the determination of effectiveness is largely for the lawen·
forcement agency itself to make and not for the courts. 114 In defending
this position, the Court referred to the language in Brown as a "gen·
eral[ized] reference," and then went on to refute the Michigan court's
analysis of how this test was applied in the Court's Delaware v. Prouse
and United States v. Martinez·Fuerte 115 holdings. 116
In Prouse, the Court determined that, in order to rid the roads of
unlicensed drivers and unsafe vehicles, random stops of automobiles
without any individualized suspicion of criminal activity violated the
Fourth Amendment. ll7 The Sitz majority acknowledged that in
Prouse, "we observed that no empirical evidence indicated that such
stops would be an effective means of promoting roadway safety."1l8
The Sitz Court then quoted from Prouse that "it seems common sense
that the percentage of all drivers on the road who are driving without
a license is very small and the number of licensed drivers who will be
stopped in order to find one unlicensed operator will be large indeed."119 The Sitz Court did not mention that the Prouse opinion referred to the question at issue in the case as to whether there was a
"sufficiently productive mechanism" to justify the seizure of an automobile. 12o Nor did it mention that in deciding this issue, the Prouse
Court considered "the alternative methods available" in reaching its
conclusion that "the incremental contribution to highway safety" of
110. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 448 (reporting that the Michigan trial court found the
checkpoint violated the Fourth Amendment).
111. Id.
112. See id. at 449 (discussing the magnitude of the drunk driving problem and the
level of intrusion on seized motorists at checkpoints before discussing the effectiveness
of sobriety checkpoints).
113. Id. at 453.
114. Id.
115. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
116. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453-54.
117. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 657.
118. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 454.
119. Id.
120. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659.
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the automobile stops in that case did not justify seizures without any
individualized suspicion. 121 Thus, the Prouse Court did see clear constitutional relevance in assessing the effectiveness of the law enforcement procedure at issue.
The Sitz Court responded to this discussion of effectiveness in
Prouse by attempting to distinguish the sobriety checkpoints in Sitz
from the stops to check for unlicensed drivers in Prouse. First, it noted
that Prouse involved a random stop rather than a checkpoint. 122
While this is true and, as the Court had held previously, has a bearing
on the degree of the intrusion, it in no way detracts from the language
in Prouse requiring a judicial analysis of the effectiveness of the law
enforcement method involved in a suspicionless seizure. Second, the
Sitz Court said that unlike Prouse, it did not involve "a complete absence of empirical data" supporting the law enforcement program. 123
An examination of that data, however, is wholly unsupportive of the
notion that checkpoints achieve either of their goals.
In Martinez-Fuerte, the Court found that a fixed checkpoint close
to the United States-Mexico border that was established to apprehend
and deter smugglers of undocumented aliens did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. 124 The Sitz Court pointed to the fact that border
area checkpoints netted a smaller arrest to detention ratio than the
sobriety checkpoints at issue in Sitz. To the Court, this apparently
demonstrated that the low apprehension level at sobriety checkpoints
did not prove their ineffectiveness. 125 What is notable about the Sitz
Court's references to the Martinez-Fuerte opinion, however, is what
the Court then said and what it did not say.
The Sitz Court quoted from Martinez-Fuerte that the record in
that case "provides a rather complete picture of the effectiveness of the
San Clemente checkpoint."126 Thus the Court in Martinez-Fuerte
looked directly at effectiveness as a factor in determining the constitutionality of the checkpoint. In fact, the Court in Martinez-Fuerte went
on to assess the effectiveness of that checkpoint in ways that would be
most instructive in evaluating sobriety checkpoints. 127 The MartinezFuerte Court noted that the checkpoints were an integral part of a
comprehensive method of apprehending and preventing the smug121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

[d.
Sitz, 496 U.S. at 454.
[d.
See United States v. Marlinez-Fuerle, 428 U.S. 543, 566-67 (1976).
Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455.
[d. (emphasis added).
Martinez·Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 553-54.
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gling of illegal aliens across the border with Mexico. l2 ;3 Set up in strategic locations on high-speed highways leading away from the border,
the checkpoints were designed to deny the smugglers access to highways that made for easy escape and access to large cities. As the Martinez-Fuerte Court declared, referring to cars used to smuggle
undocumented aliens across the border, "[T]he prospect of such inquiries forces others onto less efficient roads that are less heavily traveled,
slowing their movement and making them more vulnerable to detection by roving patrols."l29 Thus, despite the fact that such checkpoints uncovered comparatively few undocumented aliens, the
Martinez-Fuerte Court regarded them as integral parts of a comprehensive scheme to protect the areas around the Mexican border from
those who smuggle undocumented aliens across it. There was no evidence in Sitz, nor does it seem likely, that sobriety checkpoints have
any comparable benefit.l30
In its opinion in Martinez-Fuerte, the Court observed that without
checkpoints stopping cars for "particularized study," there was no way
of identifying the cars carrying undocumented aliens driving on highspeed roads. l3l In contrast, the Prouse Court noted that traffic laws
were best enforced through police reaction to observed violations. l32
As to the deterrent impact of checking for unlicensed drivers before
developing individualized suspicion, the Court asserted that such
drivers, who are undeterred by the possibility of being discovered after
suspicious activity or at post-accident investigations, are unlikely to
be deterred by random inspections. l33 Such reasoning applies with
more force to drunk drivers who, for reasons noted earlier, are even
less susceptible to deterrence and who are far more likely to exhibit

128. See id. at 556-57 (noting that checkpoints apprehend smugglers and illegal
aliens who use major highways and increases detections of such persons by forcing them
onto less traveled roads).
129. Id. at 557 (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883-85 (1975».
130. See James H. Newhouse, Comment, Interference with the Right to Free Movement: Stopping and Search of Vehicles, 51 CAL. L. REV 907, 915 (1963) (stating that
checkpoint roadblocks set up to check drivers licenses is a "safety measure which applies to all roads within the state, and violation is as likely in one place as another")
(emphasis added). In State v. Olgaard, the court noted that motorists could not have
been aware of the sobriety checkpoint roadblock in question and all motorists unexpectedly encountered the checkpoint on that road. 248 N.W.2d 392, 394 (S.D. 1976). Because sobriety checkpoints interdict motorists by surprise and take officers away from
patrolling side roads, they are unlikely to be part of any similar comprehensive scheme
to force motorists onto smaller roads where detection of criminal activity might be easier, as discussed in Martinez-Fuerte.
131. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557.
132. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659.
133. Id. at 660.
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signs of their condition to police officers observing their driving
pattern. l34
In examining the level ofthe intrusion generated by the seizure at
sobriety checkpoints (the third part of the Brown test), the Sitz Court
analogized sobriety checkpoints to border area checkpoints. l35 The
Court here dismissed the distinction between checkpoints whose locations are known and those that catch the driver by surprise. l36 Previous cases had held that the unpredictability or frightening nature of a
seizure significantly raises the level of the intrusion. l37
The holding in Sitz was deeply flawed both as to its interpretation
of previous Supreme Court holdings and its treatment or non-treatment of the empirical data contained in the record of the case. l38
Worse still it gave the ultimate judicial sanction to a law enforcement
technique born of the media's and public's understandable but misdirected concern about the serious problem posed by drunk drivers.
The use of sobriety checkpoints to combat drunk driving serves as
a notable example of a flawed response to hot crimes. Law enforcement chose a crime prevention mechanism that at best had a highly
dubious record of success and at worst proved to be a clear failure for
dealing with the crime problem. What the mechanism does have working for it, however, is that it is highly visible. Politicians leap to support the mechanism because it is a concrete sign that they are
sensitive to the problem and innovative in their approach to dealing
with it. They use the media to help spread their message. Courts rely
on deeply flawed empirical support or find excuses to discount the
need for empirical support in upholding the program. Worse still, they
stretch their reasoning and the use of precedent in finding no constitutional violation exists. As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent in Sitz,
"[C]onsensus that a particular law enforcement technique serves a
laudable purpose has never been the touchstone of constitutional
analysis."l39
Another manifestation of hot crimes is the rise of one-issue interest groups formed exclusively to combat the problem crime. The ubiquitous advocacy group, Mothers Against Drunk Driving ("MADD"),
played a significant role in piping up public angst about drunk driv134. See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
135. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453.
136. [d. at 451-52.
137. See, e.g., Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558-59; United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S.
891,895 (1975); see generally Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
138. See State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 362 (Minn. 2004) ("Sitz was a radical
departure from how a Terry-style balancing test had previously been applied and how
the state and individual interests should have been weighed in the context of such
roadblocks. ").
139. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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ing. MADD drew attention to such things as the seriousness of the
problem created by the drunk driver,140 the overly lenient sentences
that many drunk drivers received at that time, and the need for new
legislation. 141 All of these actions were good to a point.
While MADD has forever changed the way the public perceives
drunk driving, the organization has undergone a paradigm shift in recent years. One journalist grouped MADD with other "charities gone
bad" because it has taken advantage of its past success to inoculate it
from its fundamental change in focus and tactics. 142 For instance,
MADD has shifted from "Don't drive drunk" to "Don't drink and drive"
and seeks to put breathalyzers in every new car in America. 143 Even
Candy Lightner, MADD's founder, believes the organization she began has succumbed to social hysteria regarding drunk driving. 144
Lightner abandoned the organization 145 in part because she believed
MADD's missionary zeal for punishment caused the organization to
lose its direction thereby doing the victims of drunk drivers a disservice.1 46 She also leveled accusations against MADD that it manipulated data, so called "Chicken Little" tactics, in order to justify "neoProhibitionist" public policies. 147 For instance, MADD "defines down"
drunk driving by arguing that even low blood alcohol content ("BAC")
while driving equate to dangerous driving under the influence. MADD
does this despite the fact that evidence suggests that driver fatality
rates do not increase appreciably until a BAC reaches .1%.148 Furthermore, even if social hysteria is not to blame for MADD's excesses,
140. MADD created a high recognition rate with its brand in part by using rhetorical devices such as drunk driver instead of driving, holding itself out to be the "voice of
the victim," and successful use of the media. See Reinarman, supra note 27, at 98-99,
105-06.
141. Id. at 100-01, 107-08. This included mandatory jail sentences, sharply increased fines, reduced plea bargaining for drunk-driving offenses, lowering the BAC
level for intoxicated from .10% to .08% or lower, and per se standards where certain
BAC levels were in of themselves criminal.
142. Richard Berman, Charities Behaving Badly; Dollars from Nai"ue Donors are
Sometime Misused, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2010, at B-1.
143. Id. MADD has also become a bad investment for philanthropists. The American Institute of Philanthropy gave MADD poor marks for its fundraising practices, noting that while charities should spend $35 or less to raise $100, MADD regularly doubles
that amount. Id.
144. Katherine Griffin, No Longer MADD, THIS WORLD, Aug. 7, 1994, at 8.
145. In subsequent years after MADD, Lightner worked for the Beverage Institute,
a lobbyist organization that lobbies on behalf of restaurateurs who have liquour licenses-a position at odds with her former role as the head of MADD. Walt Wiley,
Candy Lightner's New Cause: MADD Founder Now Heads Group Fighting Bias Against
Arabs, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 18, 1994.
146. Id. ("MADD helps you deal with anger . . . but I really think it prolongs
denial.").
147. See Radley Balko, Targeting the Social Drinker Is Just MADD, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
9, 2002, http://www.cato.org/research/articlesibalko-021209.html.
148. Id.
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such defining down helps MADD reiterate its relevance and raise
money.149 MADD's missionary zeal to punish drunk drivers has
caused it to ignore equally or more dangerous drivers such as speeders, cell phone users, and excessive drinkers.15o Lightner stated, "If
we really want to save lives, let's go after the most dangerous drivers
on the road."151
Another manifestation of the hot crime syndrome is the passage
and application of laws that are either of questionable value or are
excessively intrusive. In Pennsylvania, for example, drivers can have
their licenses removed on drunk driving grounds for honestly reporting to their doctor that they enjoy a daily six-pack ofbeer. 152 In one
instance, Keith Emerich, who sought medical help regarding an irregular heartbeat,153 told his doctor that he imbibed a six-pack of
Budweisers a day. For this, his license was taken way,154 This occurred without any showing that Emerich drove in violation of the
drunk driving laws. 155
In addition, police are taking expansive steps to collect and preserve evidence of drunk driving. Under a federal program, select
Idaho police officers are carrying needles and being trained to withdraw blood from suspected drunk drivers. 156 This is in an effort to
curtail the number of drunk driving trials and to see if blood drawing
is an effective strategy against drunk driving. 157 One Idaho deputy
prosecutor noted that while the police cannot "hold down a suspect
and force them to breathe into a tube," her understanding ofIdaho law
was that the police could forcefully take blood. 158 If the Idaho program is successful, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration will encourage police nationwide to undergo similar training.159
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Patrick Kerkstra, Fessing Up to Doctor Costs Drinker His License, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 6, 2004, http://www.doctordeluca_com/Library/PublicHealthlFessingUpTo
DocCostsLicense04. pdf.
153. Martha Raffaele, Court Upholds Suspension of Beer Drinker's License, AsSOCIATED PRESS, Aug_ 17,2004_
154. Id. Though Emerich refused alcohol counseling or to have an interlock device
placed in his vehicle, he did admit at his hearing to having had "a few beers" on occasion
before driving. Id.
155. Id. The court did note, however, that Emerich had a previous conviction for
drunk driving. Id.
156. Lawrence Taylor, DUI Cops Now Armed with Guns, Batons . .. and Needles,
LAWRENCE TAYLOR's DUI BLOG (Sept. 16, 2009), http://www.duiblog.comJ2009/09/16/duicops-now-armed -with -guns-batonsand-needles!.
157. See id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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In a similar vein, an Indiana man who was suspected of drunk
driving was subdued and force-catheterized. 160 The man registered a
.07% BAC on a breathalyzer test and a search warrant was issued for
blood and urine samples. 161 Blood was drawn at a nearby hospital,
however, the man was unable to provide a urine sample. 162 The man
was then shackled to his hospital bed and forcefully catheterized
against his Will. 163 The blood test revealed that the man's BAC did
not exceed the Indiana limit for driving. 164 It is fair to question
whether this procedure and the others noted above are warranted for
suspected drunk driving.
A recent policy to release certain offenders in Illinois further demonstrates the societal over-reaction to drunk driving. In order to save
five million dollars, low-level, non-violent offenders were released
from a Chicago prison during the 2009 winter holiday season. 165 The
offenders included drunk drivers, burglars, financial criminals, and
drug criminals. 166 Upon learning of the early release of the drunk
drivers, MADD intervened and pressured the State Corrections Department to reclassify them as violent offenders. 167 The Corrections
Department succumbed to the pressure, agreed with MADD, and put
eighteen drunk drivers back in prison while the burglars, drug
criminals, and financial criminals remained released. 16B
In addition to the sometimes disproportionally harsh treatment
drunk drivers receive, they are at times subject to penalties that apply
only to them. For example, an Arizona law allows judges to fine DUI
offenders for the cost of their stay in jail. 169 This fine is unique to
drunk drivers.170 Though law enforcement officials are encouraging
160. Forced Catheterization Used in DUI Case, WPBF.COM (Sept. 3, 2009), http://
www.wpbf.com/healthl207037311detail.html.
161. Jennifer Nelson, Man Sues After Forced Catheterization, IND. LAw. (Sept. 1,
2009), http://www.theindianalawyer.com/articleiprint?artic1eId=21195.
162. Id.
163. Forced Catheterization Used in DUI Case, supra note 160; Nelson, supra note
161.
164. Forced Catheterization Used in DUI Case, supra note 160. To boot, the DUI
suspect was also charged with obstructing justice for his inability to provide a urine
sample. See id.
165. Frank Main & Chris Fusco, Early Release Ends for DUI Offenders: 18 Sent
Back to Prison to Serve Out Terms, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 25, 2009, at 2.
166. Frank Main & Chris Fusco, Inmates Home for Holidays: Drunken Drivers, RipOff Artists Stretch Definition of 'Non-Violent, Low-Lever Offenders,' CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Dec. 22, 2009.
167. Main & Fusco, supra note 166, at 2.
168. Id.
169. More Ariz. Drunk Drivers Could Pay for Jail Stays, AZCENTRAL.COM (Sept. 7,
2009), http://www.azcentral.com/newslarticlesl2009/09/07120090907pimacounty-dui07ON.html; Lawrence Taylor, The DUI Double Standard, LAWRENCE TAYLOR'S DUI BLOG
(Sept. 7, 2009), http://www.duiblog.coml2009/09/07/the-dui-double-standard-4I.
170. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 28-1444 (2011).
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judges to mete out this fine, judges are reluctant to do so because of
the huge financial costs already associated with drunk driving under
Arizona law. l71
Perhaps because they believe the drunk driving laws are not enforced adequately, some private citizens have taken justice into their
own hands with regard to drunk drivers. Citizens in Milwaukee
formed a group on Craigslist whose supposed purpose is to report
drunk drivers to the authorities. 172 The group stakes out a bar, waits
for a seemingly overly intoxicated patron to enter his vehicle, and then
reports the vehicle to the police. 173 More controversial is the online
statement by some members that they lie or exaggerate to ensure the
police respond, regardless of whether a driver is operating his or her
car dangerously.174
As of late, with the advent of portable communication and entertainment devices, some skeptics question whether drunk driving is
the most pressing danger on the road. A Los Angeles Times article
entitled "Targeting the Social Drinker is Just MADD" reported a British study that found that "cell phone use while driving caused significantly more impairment than a .08 blood-alcohol level."175 That
study's conclusion is supported by a Car and Driver study, which
found that text message usage can be even more dangerous than alcohol impaired driving, especially at slower speeds. 176 States have now
responded to the dangers posed by drivers who use cell phones or send
text messages, but such individuals are not treated with anywhere
near the same harshness as those who drive while impaired by alcohol. These studies do not suggest that drunk driving is not a significant danger, but they do raise questions about whether it is being
treated with disproportionate harshness.
B.

CHILD SEX ABUSE

In the early 1980s in Kern County, California, a string of child
abuse cases arose in which many young children in the area voiced
allegations of horrific and prolonged sexual abuse by family members,
neighbors, and friends. These cases were fueled by suggestive inter171. Taylor, supra note 169.
172. Brad Hicks, Fox 6 Exclusive: Craigslist DUI Busters, Fox6NOW.COM (Jan. 20,
2010), http://www.fox6now.comlnewsiwiti-100 120-craigslist-narcs-dui,0, 7859851.story.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Balko, supra note 147.
176. See Michael Austin, Texting While Driving: How Dangerous Is It?, CAR &
DRIVER, June 2009, http://www.caranddriver.comlfeaturesl09q2ltexting_while_driving_
how_dangerous_is_it_-feature.
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views and prosecutorial misconduct, which ultimately led the California appellate courts to overturn the convictions.
In the 1985 case People v. Pitts,177 several adults in Kern County
were accused of performing sexual acts on children and forcing the
children to perform sexual acts on each other. As investigators and
child services workers interviewed the children, their stories evolved
and more child victims and adult abusers emerged. 178 Eventually the
children's allegations came to include tales of group sexual orgies. 179
Initially, when several additional children were questioned regarding their presence at these orgies, they vehemently denied it.180
However, after being questioned by interviewers several times in a
short period, the children changed their stories and claimed that they
and others had been sexually abused. 181 Based on this information
alone, arrest warrants were issued and charges were brought against
seven adults for conspiracy, forcible lewd and lascivious acts on children under the age of fourteen, use of children for purposes of pornography, child endangerment, and assault,182
The children's allegations included being taped and photographed
while being molested by the adults and being forced to perform various sexual acts on each other.183 The children claimed they were
forced to drink beer and whiskey and to consume drugs, including marijuana, cocaine, and heroin. 184 The children stated that they were
strapped down to a board and injected with drugs if they failed to behave. l85 They claimed that they were threatened with knives and
guns if they told anyone of the abuse. l86
However, the children's stories were rampant with inconsistencies about the time and location of the alleged abuse. The allegations
regarding alcohol and drug use were also different in each child's testimony. In addition, almost all ofthe children picked different individuals as their abusers from lineups conducted during the
investigation. 187 Some of the individuals chosen from the lineups had
no relation to the case. 188 Lastly, during searches of the defendants'
177. 273 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1990).
178. People v. Pitts, 273 Cal. Rptr. 757, 775 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
179. Pitts, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 775.
180. [d.
181. [d. at 775-77. In fact, one child only conceded she had been abused several
months into the investigation after meeting with investigators and social services workers 20-25 times to discuss the allegations. [d.
182. [d. at 771.
183. [d. at 778.
184. [d. at 778-81.
185. [d. at 774-90.
186. [d. at 778-81.
187. [d. at 776.
188. [d.
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homes, no pornography, drug paraphernalia, cameras, or video equipment was ever found. 189
Nonetheless, each defendant was convicted of the charged crimes
in 1985. 190 The defendants were sentenced to varying terms of 285,
373, and 405 years in prison. 191 In 1990, however, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of California overturned the convictions on
appeal.
On appeal, the court noted many forms of gross prosecutorial misconduct in the way the investigation and prosecution were handled. 192
The court documented several improper and argumentative remarks
made by the prosecution during closing arguments.1 93 The questioning techniques of the prosecution during direct and cross examination
of witnesses involved "inadmissible evidence and improper innuendo."194 Similarly, throughout the trial, the prosecutor attempted to
prove his case using innuendos rather than relevant, material evidence. Lastly, the appellate court found that the jury was improperly
influenced by the trial judge's lack of impartiality. The appellate
court noted several comments made by the trial judge in the presence
of the jury, which implied that the prosecution's case was more credible and that the judge and prosecution were on the same side. 195
These various forms of gross misconduct during the investigation and
subsequent trial compelled the appellate court to reverse the convictions and sentences of the defendants.
In People u. Stoll,196 a case that occurred in the same county and
the same year as Pitts, four adults were charged with thirty-six counts
of lewd and lascivious acts against seven young boys in the area. The
defendants were convicted on all counts in a case involving essentially
the same investigators and prosecutors as the Pitts case.
Similar stories of a sex ring emerged after considerable prompting
by local investigators and child services workers. The children all testified that adults performed sexual acts on them and that these acts
were photographed. 197 However, the children did not agree on exactly
what was done or who took the photographs. 198 As two lead investigators, one from the Sheriffs Department and the other from Child Protective Services, met with the children several times over a ten-day
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

[d. at 775.
at 772.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

at 806-07.
at 809-18.
at 829-30.
[d. at 860-61.
783 P.2d 698 (Cal. 1989).
People v. Stoll, 783 P.2d 698, 701-02 (Cal. 1989).
Stoll, 783 P.2d at 701-02.
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period, allegations and depictions of events began to change. 199 During these interviews the children were first informed that other children had made allegations of abuse, and then they were asked to
describe their own abuse. 20o Such leading and suggestive interview
techniques were used throughout the entire investigation.
Similar to the investigation in the Pitts case, no photographs of
the alleged sexual acts were found. In addition, no medical examinations were performed on the child accusers and the interviews with
the children were not recorded. 201 As one article noted, "[E]ven if you
believe[d] that someone did molest one or more of the boys, much of
the kids' testimony pushed the bounds of plausibility-and of anatomy."202 Still, all four defendants were convicted on the respective
counts and received varying sentences of 40, 31, 16, and 14 years in
prison depending on their alleged involvement in the crimes. 203
In 1989, the Supreme Court of California overturned two of the
four convictions after reviewing the investigation and prosecution of
the case. The conviction of one of the defendants, John Stoll, was not
overturned until years later, after he had spent fifteen years in
prison. 204 The remaining defendant completed his sentence and was
moved to a state mental hospital after the court determined that he
was a sexually violent predator. 205
Many of the child accusers, now adults, say the abuse they so vividly described years ago never happened. 206 The accusers claim they
"felt pressured by the investigators to describe sex acts. "207 One of the
accusers, Ed Sampley, said that when he was initially confronted with
questions about sex acts and molestation that Stoll allegedly committed, he vehemently denied it. 20B But after repeated interviews with
suggestive questioning, "at some point-Sampley doesn't remember
when or exactly why-he changed his story."209 When the boys attempted to recant their accusations soon after the trial, their parents
were told that they were "in denial" or "too embarrassed to tell ... the
truth. "210
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

ld. at 702-03.
ld.
ld. at 703.
Jones, supra note 57.
Stoll, 783 P.2d at 707 n.15.
Jones, supra note 57.
ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.
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Years later, in 2004, many of the accusers came from miles away
to officially recant their stories at Stoll's hearing. 211 The judge ultimately overturned Stoll's conviction, finding that "the children had
been improperly interviewed, making their testimony unreliable."212
In 1983 in Manhattan Beach, California, accusations of child
abuse arose against the owners and aides of the McMartin Preschool. 213 Peggy McMartin Buckley and her mother, Virginia McMartin owned the preschool.2 14 Ray Buckey, Peggy's son, worked as a
school aide at McMartin Preschool. 215 In August of 1983, Judy Johnson called the Manhattan Beach police to report that Ray Buckey
abused her two-and-a-half-year-old son. 216 Although there was no
physical evidence of abuse, police proceeded to investigate the
accusations. 217
In early September of 1983, the Chief of Police sent a letter to 200
parents of children who were attending or had attended McMartin
Preschool at some point in the past. 218 The letter indicated that Ray
Buckey was under investigation for criminal acts of child molestation. 219 The letter requested that parents ask their children whether
they had been a witness to or a victim of any relevant crime. Specifically, the letter directed the parents to ask whether their children had
ever witnessed Ray Buckey leave the room with a child during naptime or if they had ever seen him tie up a child. 220 The Chief of Police
indicated in his letter that "possible criminal acts include: oral sex,
fondling of genitals, buttocks or chest area, and sodomy, possibly committed under the pretense of 'taking the child's temperature.'"221 This
211. [d.
Perhaps more attention should have been paid to how the children became victims of the tactics employed by over-zealous investigators. This victimization
was so severe in some cases that it lasted well into their adulthood. The adult
Ed Sampley, for example, reported how the pressure tactics used by the investigators still distorted his sense of trust. Then 28, Sampley told how he is afraid
to be around his stepdaughter's friends or to give his own 3-year-old daughter a
bath lest someone accuse him of molesting them.
[d.
212. [d.
213. Earl, supra note 56.
214. McMartin' Ritual Abuse Cases in Manhattan Beach, CA, RELIGIOUS TOLER·
ANCE.ORG, http://www.religioustolerance.org/ra_mcmar.htm (last updated Oct. 29,
2005).
215. [d.
216. Earl, supra note 56.
217. McMartin' Ritual Abuse Cases in Manhattan Beach, CA, supra note 214.
218. [d.
219. Letter from Police Chief Kulhmeyer, Jr. to McMartin Preschool Parents (Sept.
8, 1983), available at http://www.law.umkc.edulfaculty/projectslfirialslmcmartinlletter
toparents.html.
220. [d.
221. [d.
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letter "set off a panic and, some lawyers have said, tainted the case
from the outset."222 A local television station soon picked up on the
story and reported that the McMartin Preschool may be linked to pornography rings and sex industries. 223
Hundreds of parents came forward to have their children interviewed by representatives of the Children's Institute Internationa1. 224
Many of the children initially denied being molested, but ultimately
360 interviewed children claimed they had been abused. 225 Taped interviews of the children later indicated that they were fed suggestive
questions, urged to admit to the abuse, and rewarded for saying they
had been sexually abused. 226 One hundred and fifty children underwent medical examinations. Although there were no physical signs of
abuse that typically accompany sexually abused children, the doctor
claimed to have performed new tests which indicated that approximately 120 children had been abused. 227 These tests were later found
to be an inaccurate indicator of abuse. 228
Tales of abuse by the children included satanic conspiracy, animal
sacrifice, ritualistic murder of infants, acting in pornographic movies,
flying witches, and secret underground tunnels. 229 Despite the incredulity of these stories, Ray Buckey, Peggy McMartin Buckey, Virginia
McMartin, and several other individuals associated with the school
were indicted on 115 counts of child abuse in 1984.230 The charges
were later increased to 321 counts involving forty-eight children. 231
Ultimately, the prosecution charged only Ray Buckey' and Peggy McMartin Buckey and dismissed charges against the other indicted
individuals. 232
In 1990, after years of investigation and trial, the jury handed
down its verdict. 233 Peggy McMartin Buckey was found not guilty on
all counts and Ray Buckey was found not guilty on thirty-nine of fiftytwo counts, with a hung jury on the remaining thirteen counts against
222. Robert Reinhold, The Longest Trial-A Post-Mortem; Collapse of Child-Abuse
Case: So Much Agony for So Little, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1990, http://www.nytimes.com/
1990/01l241us!longest-trial-post-mortem-collapse-child-abuse-case-so-much-agony-forso-little.html?scp=l&sq=&st=nyt.
223. McMartin' Ritual Abuse Cases in Manhattan Beach, CA, supra note 214.
224. ld.
225. Reinhold, supra note 222.
226. Earl, supra note 56; Reinhold, supra note 222.
227. Earl, supra note 56; McMartin' Ritual Abuse Cases in Manhattan Beach, CA,
supra note 214.
228. McMartin' Ritual Abuse Cases in Manhattan Beach, CA, supra note 214.
229. ld.
230. Reinhold, supra note 222.
231. ld.
232. McMartin' Ritual Abuse Cases in Manhattan Beach, CA, supra note 214.
233. Earl, supra note 56.

64

CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

him.234 By this time, Ray Buckey had spent five years in jaiI.235
Later that same year, after a re-trial on the remaining thirteen
counts, a different jury also remained hung. 236
Similar to the aftermath of the other child abuse cases discussed
above, some of the child accusers in this case later recanted their stories. Kyle Zirpolo, a child who attended McMartin Preschool from
1979-1980 when he was eight years old, had told stories of sex games,
animal sacrifice, and child pornography in interviews with investigators and in his testimony in front of the Grand Jury.237 Zirpolo later
recanted, claiming no one at McMartin Preschool "did anything to me,
and I never saw them do anything."238 Zirpolo stated that interviewers would ask the same questions until they got the answer they
wanted. 239 He claimed that "there were so many kids saying all these
things happened that you didn't want to be the one who said nothing.
You wouldn't be believed if you said that."240
In 1984 in Jordan, Minnesota, James Rud was arrested on allegations of child abuse. 241 During the police investigation of the alleged
abuse, additional allegations of abuse and murder arose within the
small community.242 Eventually the State charged twenty-four adults
with molesting thirty-seven children. 243 Of these twenty-four adults,
one pled guilty, two were acquitted at trial, and charges were dropped
against the remaining twenty-one defendants. 244 The Scott County
Attorney claimed that "the charges were dismissed in order to shield
the children from the trauma of trial and to prevent the disclosure of
evidence relating to an ongoing murder investigation."245
Following dismissal of the charges by the Scott County Attorney
against twenty-one of the defendants, the Attorney General, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the State Bureau of Criminal Appre234. Id.
235. Reinhold, supra note 222.
236. Earl, supra note 56.
237. Debbie Nathan, I'm Sorry: A Long-Delayed Apology from One of the Accusers in
the Notorious McMartin Preschool Molestation Case 1, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2005, http://
articles.latimes.com/2005/octJ30/magazineitm-mcmartin44.
238. Id. at 3.
239. Id. at 1.
240. Id. at 2.
241. Lawrence D. Spiegel, The Phenomenon of Child Abuse Hysteria as a Social
Syndrome: The Case for a New Kind of Expert Testimony, 2INST. FOR PSYCHOL. THERA.
PIES, no. 1, 1990, available at http://www.ipt-forensics.com/journal/volume2/j2_1_4.htm
#enO. James Rud was, in fact, a confessed child abuser and pled guilty to several counts
of abuse. Hubert H. Humphrey, Ill, The Scott County Investigation, THE A-TEAM, Feb.
12, 1985, http://www.a-team.org/scott_county.html.
242. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 868 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
243. Craig, 497 U.S. at 868.
244. Id.
245. Feher, supra note 60, at 239.
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hension performed an investigation into the allegations of murder and
abuse. 246 The Attorney General's Report ultimately concluded that
there was "no credible evidence to support allegations of murder,
which arose during the sexual abuse investigation" and there was "insufficient evidence to justify the filling of any new sex abuse
charges."247 It went on to detail the inherent flaws in the investigation and prosecution that tainted the proceedings from the start. Ultimately, "any evidence, or testimony, that may have existed was ruined
by the investigation."248
The Report indicated that "allegations of child abuse ranging from
gross sexual abuse to murder arose in Jordan, Minnesota."249 When
the allegations arose, many of the "children were removed from their
homes and isolated from" their families for long periods of time, even
if they denied being sexually abused. 250 When children were told that
they could return home if they revealed that they had been abused,
many confessed to being abused. 251 However, their stories were incredible and inconsistent. In his initial interview, a child described
three murders in graphic detaiI.252 In a subsequent interview, the
same child described "seven children being stabbed, mutilated, and/or
shot."253 Later, he claimed that five bodies had been dumped in a
Minnesota River.254 Ultimately, the child admitted that he had lied
about the murders.255
Other children similarly admitted to fabricating stories. One
child claimed that he made up detailed stories of sexual abuse because
he told the interviewers what they wanted to hear.256 Another child
admitted that "he got the idea of ritualistic torture from a television"
show and that "he lied about the murders because he wanted to please
the investigators."257 Yet another child stated that she made up stories about people being killed because her friend asked her to do SO.258
246. Humphrey, supra note 241.
247. Id.
248. Feher, supra note 60, at 239.
249. Brian L. Schwalb, Note, Child Abuse Trials and the Confrontation of Trauma·
tized Witnesses: Defining 'Confrontation' to Protect Both Children and Defendants, 26
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 185, 217 n.3 (1991).
250. Humphrey, supra note 241.
251. Spiegel, supra note 241.
252. Humphrey, supra note 241.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Diana Younts, Note, Evaluating and Admitting Expert Opinion Testimony in
Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 41 DUKE L.J. 691, 731 (1991).
257. Humphrey, supra note 241.
258. Id.
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Many of the children were questioned multiple times at length,
but records of the interviews were rarely made. For example, the police interviewed one nine-year-old girl approximately twenty times
during the investigation, but only four written reports of the interviews were found. 259 Some of the children were interviewed together,
and others were told what other child accusers had recounted. 260 In
one interview, "a child was told that his sibling had made allegations
against a parent. He was then asked to describe what had happened
to him."261
The investigation was also characterized by the lack of corroborating physical and demonstrative evidence recovered. Despite allegations of child pornography, police never recovered any photographs. 262
There were also no physical signs of abuse on any of the children. 263
Investigators nonetheless proceeded to arrest suspects on little more
than the children's bare allegations. 264 To compensate for a lack of
evidence, the County Attorney sought to induce the various defendants to provide information in exchange for plea bargains. 265 When
defendant James Rud was first arrested, he described an elaborate
child sex ring in exchange for a reduced sentence. 266 He later admitted that he had completely fabricated this information to please investigators and receive a lighter sentence. 267
While Attorney General Hubert Humphrey expressed his concern
over the problem of child abuse in Minnesota, he made the point that
"[iJn the Scott County cases ... something clearly went awry."268 As
Justice Scalia aptly noted in his dissent in Maryland v. Craig,269
"There is no doubt that some sexual abuse took place in Jordan; but
there is no reason to believe that it was as widespread as charged."270
IV. FLAWS IN SOCIETY'S TREATMENT OF CHILD SEX ABUSE
By examining the flaws that existed in the way child sex abuse
was handled by police, prosecutors, legislators, and the media, the societal impact that results from a crime becoming hot can be seen quite
259. Lucy S. McGough, For the Record: Videotaping Investigative Interviews, 1
& L. 370, 372 (1995).
260. Humphrey, supra note 241.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Spiegel, supra note 241.
264. Humphrey, supra note 241.
265. Id.
266. Spiegel, supra note 241.
267. Id.; Humphrey, supra note 241.
268. Humphrey, supra note 241.
269. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
270. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 868 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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clearly. Additionally, such an examination can point the way to avoiding similar problems in the future as crimes become hot.
The child abuse hysteria of the 1980s was compounded by various
flaws throughout the investigation and prosecution of child sexual
abuse cases. These flaws included investigators' disregard of unbelievable and inconsistent allegations from child accusers, interviewers'
use of junk science or good science in a questionable manner, courts'
submission to undue pressure from the public and the media, and
over-prosecution. The combination of these flaws in varying degrees
produced tragic results for both the child accusers and the wrongfully
accused defendants.
The problems with investigating child abuse allegations in the
1980s began with the child accusers' tales of abuse. Prior to the 1980s,
prosecutors were hesitant to take on cases involving allegations by
young children because of a widespread belief that children would tell
fantastical stories rather than relate factual accounts. 271 However,
the overwhelming response to allegations of child abuse during the
height of the daycare scandals was best characterized as a "refusal to
disbelieve," even in the face of the most outrageous stories. 272 Many
of the stories that the children told were either inherently unbelievable or at least inconsistent enough to raise doubts in the
investigation.
In the McMartin Preschool case discussed above, panic ensued
when parents received a letter from the police informing them of allegations of child sexual abuse and urging them to discover whether
their children had also been abused. 273 Soon, stories emerged of satanic rituals, live animals being slaughtered, and infant child sacrifices. 274 The alleged victims of the child abuse asserted that in
addition to being molested at the preschool, they had also been molested at various public places, "including a market, a car wash, and a
church."275 Some children claimed that they had been taken on
planes and others insisted they had been forced to drink blood. 276 Another child stated that Ray Buckey, one of the alleged abusers, had
271. JENKINS, supra note 59, at 171.
272. Id.; see also Andrew M. Luther, Comment, The Deadly Consequences of Unreli·
able Evidence: Why Child Capital Rape Statutes Threaten to Condemn the Innocent De·
fendant to Death, 43 TuLSA L. REV. 199,214 (2007) ("lD]espite the far-fetched stories the
children often told, the majority of people ... in America, were willing to believe the
children.").
273. See JENKINS, supra note 59, at 166.
274. Luther, supra note 272, at 213, 214.
275. Nancy E. Walker, Forensic Interviews of Children: The Components of Scien·
tific Validity and Legal Admissibility, 65 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 149 (2002).
276. Id.
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taken him to a cemetery and forced him to dig up bodies. 277 The same
child also told stories of trap doors in the preschool with elaborate underground tunnels where lions were housed. 278 In a similar case in
New Jersey, Kelly Michaels, a kindergarten teacher, was accused of
licking peanut butter off [children's] genitals, playing a piano
while naked, forc[ing] the children to drink urine and eat feces; assaulting them with silverware, a sword and Lego
blocks; forcing them to play the "cat game" where they all got
naked and licked each other; amputating children's penises;
[and] putting a real car and tree on top of one of them. 279
Despite the outrageous nature of these allegations and a lack of supporting medical evidence, Kelly Michaels was convicted of 115 counts
of child abuse and sentenced to forty-seven years in prison. 28o
Although there was no corroborating evidence for the children's
fantastical tales, interviewers were determined not to question the
truth of their allegations, even though the stories were inherently unbelievable and inconsistent. 281 Investigators began with the premise
that children never lied about being sexually abused, and that if a
child claimed to have been sexually abused, the job of the investigators was to verify that fact. 282 At that point, investigators often encouraged children to make sexual descriptions. 283 Rather than
seeking to clarify inconsistent and outrageous descriptions of sexual
abuse through rational questioning, investigators specifically sought
to confirm the allegations of abuse. 284 In fact, investigators often ignored statements that did not conform to their theory of abuse and
instead focused on unsupported and often contradictory tales of abuse
given by the children. 285
During the extensive interviewing process leading up to trial,
many interviewers tainted children's stories and memories through
the use of junk science, or alternatively, the use of good science in a
questionable manner. The interviewers often employed leading and
suggestive questions, were improperly trained, misinterpreted supposed evidence of abuse, used anatomically correct dolls in suggestive
manners, repeatedly interviewed child accusers, and questioned mul277. Luther, supra note 272, at 213.
278. [d.
279. JENKINS, supra note 59, at 177.
280. [d.
281. See JENKINS, supra note 59, at 177 ("[W]hat were obviously fantasies were not
considered sufficient to discredit the cases reflected a new determination to believe victim testimony at all costs.").
282. [d. at 172.
283. Anderson, supra note 58, at 2144.
284. [d. at 2149.
285. See Feher, supra note 60, at 237-38.
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tiple accusers at the same time. These flaws in the investigation process led hundreds of children to raise allegations of abuse where none
had in fact occurred.
Research has shown that the specific techniques used by interviewers when questioning children about sexual abuse can have a direct impact on the child accuser's answers.286 When these techniques
are flawed in some material way, the integrity of an interviewee's response is compromised. 287 The use of suggestive questioning, such as
by coaching, bribes, and threats, makes it more likely that child interviewees will recount tales of abuse, even if they were never actually
abused. 288 Thus, the flawed techniques of the interviewers coupled
with the high suggestibility of children in general caused many false
allegations of child sexual abuse. 289
The suggestive techniques used by interviewers involved leading
questions to the children that suggested a particular answer.290 Children, therefore, answered the questions based on their perception of
the answer the interviewer wanted. 291 The children were ultimately
seeking approval from their adult interviewers in the answers they
gave. 292 At times, interviewers may not have been aware that their
questions, simply by the way or how many times they were asked, suggested the answer they sought.293 Even if unintended at times, these
suggestive interview techniques led children to give responses that
were then incorporated into the children's memories as truthful accounts of sexual abuse. 294
The use of suggestive questions and other flawed techniques
stemmed, at least in part, from a lack of skill on the part of the interviewer in child abuse investigations. As subsequent research has
shown, "[T]he skill of the interviewer directly influences whether a
child relates a true memory, discusses a false belief, affirms details
suggested by others, embellishes fantasies, or provides no information
at all."295 Although many interviewers may have believed that their
extensive educational and research backgrounds qualified them for investigating allegations of child sexual abuse, most investigators had a
286. Walker, supra note 275, at 150.
287. See id. at 151.
288. Stephen J. Ceci & Richard D. Friedman, The Suggestibility of Children: Scientific Research and Legal Implications, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 33, 85 (2000).
289. See generally Walker, supra note 275, at 161-62.
290. See id. at 161.
291. See id. at 160.
292. See JENKINS, supra note 59, at 167; see also Terese L. Fitzpatrick, Note, Innocent Until Proven Guilty: Shallow Words for the Falsely Accused in a Criminal Prosecution for Child Sexual Abuse, 12 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 175, 200-01 (1991).
293. Feher, supra note 60, at 23l.
294. Id. at 231-32; see also Fitzpatrick, supra note 292, at 20l.
295. Walker, supra note 275, at 150.

70

CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

limited understanding of both their objective and the criteria they
should have been using to determine if sexual abuse occurred. 296
Even with the use of proper techniques, it is difficult to evaluate the
reliability of a child's statements and to put those statements into a
cohesive structure. 297
In addition to the difficulties presented in gathering statements
and other evidence, another flaw in the investigation process occurred
in the interpretation of that evidence. In determining the meaning of
certain statements and behaviors, interviewers failed to be cognizant
of the fact that there is no particular type of behavior or action that
specifically indicates child sexual abuse. 298 For example, in medical
examinations conducted following allegations of sexual abuse, doctors
have found many of the supposed indicators of abuse in not abused as
well as abused children. 299 Psychological evaluations similarly resulted in the assessment of symptoms that were once thought to be
indicative of anal and genital rape but which were later found to have
interpretations wholly separate from sexual abuse. 30o
The anatomically correct doll was yet another flawed investigative tool widely used in interviewing suspected child abuse victims.
Many investigators used anatomically correct dolls in the beginning
stages of an interview with the expectation that children who were
uncomfortable talking about sexual abuse would exhibit signs of
abuse by playing with certain areas, such as the sexual organs or orifices, of the doll. 301
However, this suggestive interviewing technique may lead to false
allegations of sexual abuse. 302 Many interviewers are not trained in
how to properly use the dolls in an interview setting. 303 Therefore,
like the problems associated with interpreting medical evidence related to uncovering child sexual abuse, it is difficult to interpret the
meaning of a child's behavior in playing with an anatomically correct
doll. In addition to the fact that many children who were not abused
may play with the dolls' sexual organs, interviewers ultimately tend to
find indicators of sexual abuse in many circumstances. 304 Lastly,
296. Bruce M. Giffen, Child Sexual Abuse: Problems in Evidence, 3 NEV. LAw. 13, 14
(1995).
297. [d.; see also Walker, supra note 275, at 156 ("One crucial task in conducting
forensic assessments of children is to determine which factors, if any, impinge upon
their ability to comprehend, recall accurately, and report past events.").
298. Giffen, supra note 296, at 13.
299. [d.
300. JENKINS, supra note 59, at 167.
301. Luther, supra note 272, at 220.
302. [d.
303. [d. at 221.
304. Giffen, supra note 296.
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there is no uniform standard available for interviewers to determine
what kind of sexualized play may indicate abuse. 305 Thus, even those
interviewers who have received some training in the correct usage of
anatomically correct dolls may nevertheless come to different conclusions about the meaning of a child's interaction with a doll. 306
Another flaw in the investigation process occurred when interviewers questioned children on multiple, separate occasions and when
interviewers introduced information from other child accusers during
these interviews. Throughout the investigation process and continuing until the time of trial, interviewers repeatedly questioned children
on multiple occasions. 307 In addition, many interviewers often repeated the same questions during an interview. 30B This repetition becomes its own learning process and can change or create a memory.309
The phenomena of creating a memory through repetitive questions is
often irreversible, as the altered perceptions are reinforced with each
subsequent interview. 3lO AB interviewers conducted investigations of
more and more children supposedly involved in the same incident, the
interviewers became aware of common threads between the stories. 311
The interviewers may have focused their suggestive questions around
these accounts so that "repeated reinforcement of these ideas created
in the child a 'subjective reality' that an event did happen even if it
never did. "312
Similar dangers are present when an interviewer conducts an interview of multiple potential child accusers at the same time. Interviewers in these circumstances tend to assure the child interviewees
during questioning that the abuser is a bad person and deserves to be
punished. 3l3 This suggestive technique often results in children altering their answers to be consistent with those of their peers. 314 Other
times in multi-victim cases, an interviewer will interview one child at
a time but will tell the child that they have received allegations of
abuse from other children. 315 AB in the situation where multiple children are interviewed together, a child is more likely to say that he or
305. Luther, supra note 272, at 221.
306. [d.
307. [d. at 221-22; see also Walker, supra note 275, at 158.
308. Luther, supra note 272, at 222.
309. Feher, supra note 60, at 231-32.
310. [d. at 232-33.
311. See JENKINS, supra note 59, at 167.
312. Feher, supra note 60, at 233; see also Norbert Ebisike, The Evidence of Children, 44 CRIM. L. BULL., no. 5, 2008 (discussing "when an interviewer selectively reinforces certain elements of a child's report").
313. Thomas D. Lyon, The New Wave in Children's Suggestibility Research: A Critique, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1004, 1031 (1999).
314. See Anderson, supra note 58, at 2151.
315. See id.; see also Luther, supra note 272, at 224.
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she has been abused after receiving information that another child already admitted to being abused, regardless of the accuracy of the
statement. 316
Media coverage of child abuse allegations and public pressure to
prosecute the cases constituted yet another category of flaws in the
investigation process. Because the media provides an important
source of information to the public regarding crime and criminals not
generally available elsewhere, it has a great deal of influence over the
public's beliefs and attitudes about these subjects. 317 When the media
puts such great emphasis on a crime, it creates a sense of anxiety
about the crime and about being the victim of the crime. 318 The media
focuses on the most atypical crimes and offenders, thus "rais[ing] the
specter of the predatory criminal from a minor character to a common,
ever present image."319 This image often leads to an outcry for justice
by the public, which then forces prosecutors to act, regardless of the
sufficiency of the evidence. 32o
As was the case during the child abuse hysteria of the 1980s,
when the media inundates news stories with senseless acts of violence, society's instinctual reaction for dealing with the violence is to
punish those who pose a threat. 321 This perception was so strong during the investigations and trials of suspected child sexual abuse in the
1980s that it became impossible to believe that the defendants were
innocent. 322 Thus, those accused of child sexual abuse had been convicted by the media and the public before they ever stepped foot in a
courtroom.
Lastly, the concept of over-prosecution arose both during the trials of those facing child abuse charges and later in statutes enacted by
the legislature in response to infamous child sexual abuse tragedies
that received media attention throughout the country. Prosecutorial
misconduct was rampant in many of the child sexual abuse cases in
the 1980s.323 Although faced with unbelievable and inconsistent accounts of alleged abuse, prosecutors characterized the evidence as correct accounts in part because they were elicited by "skilled behavioralscience investigators." These investigations were then used to obtain
often "florid" indictments. 324
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
tion, 43
324.

Luther, supra note 272, at 225.
See CALLANAN, supra note 61, at 55.
[d. at 53.
See id. at 55-56.
See Fitzpatrick, supra note 292, at 200.
CALLANAN, supra note 61, at 56.
JENKINS, supra note 59, at 167.
See Randall Grometstein, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Noble-Cause CorrupCRIM. L. BULL., no. 1,2007.
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Prosecutors were later criticized for failing to disclose to the defense some of the most bizarre accusations of satanic rituals. A mistrial was declared in one case from St. Louis, Missouri, and a
conviction was overturned in another case from Roseburg, Oregon for
just this reason. 325 When the California appellate court overturned
the convictions of the falsely accused defendants in People v. Pitts,326
the court scolded the prosecution for making improper assertions in
closing argument, appealing to the emotions of the jury, personally
attacking the defense counsel, and referring to facts that had not been
admitted into evidence during closing arguments, on motions, or during objections. 327
In addition to the prosecutors' unfair and unethical practices in
the courtroom, state legislatures enacted harsh legislation around this
time in response to actual and alleged child sexual abuse. During the
height of child sexual abuse hysteria in the 1980s, state and federal
legislatures drafted new laws designed to protect missing or abused
children, create guidelines for registration of sex offenders, and guide
investigations of day care centers.
Today, all states require some form of sex offender registration. 328
This requirement stems in part from the federal government's threat
to withdraw federal funding in states that do not require sex offenders
to register and provide information. 329 While such registration laws
can be effective tools in combating re-offending by sexual predators,
they can also overreach. Additionally, because each state can define
the requirements for registration, there is divergence in the definition
of what constitutes a dangerous sex offender. 330
While some states require only the most serious offenders to register, other states require that all sex offenders, defined in various
ways by state statute, register and provide information. 33l Many of
these states' registration laws have become over-inclusive in the offenses for which they require registration. As a result, the laws conflict with the states' originally intended goal of protecting children
from sexual abuse. For example, Alabama requires registration for
those convicted of second-degree prostitution, even between con325. See Grometstein, supra note 323.
326. 273 Cal. Rptr. 757 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
327. People v. Pitts, 273 Cal. Rptr. 757,818 (Cal Ct. App. 1990), see also Gromet·
stein, supra note 323.
328. See Wayne A. Logan, Liberty Interests in the Preventive State: Procedural Due
Process and Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1167, 1172 (1999).
329. See id. at 1172-73.
330. JENKINS, supra note 59, at 202.
331. Daniel M. Filler, Silence and the Racial Dimension of Megan's Law, 89 IOWA L.
REV. 1535, 1548 (2004).
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senting adults. 332 Many states, including Washington, California, Indiana, and Colorado, require registration for crimes committed for the
purpose of "sexual gratification."333 Lastly, some state courts have required registration for individuals charged with, but not convicted of,
one of the many "sexual offenses" as defined in that state's statute. 334
These examples provide insight into how states have strayed from the
originally intended purpose of the registration statutes in response to
the media's portrayal of sensationalized and horrific crimes committed
by repeat offenders.
Community notification laws provide another related example of
legislation that began in response to child sexual abuse crimes. Despite the intended purpose of these statutes, they have at times incited vigilante attacks, making it difficult for offenders to live in the
community.335 These notification laws require distribution of highly
personal information about offenders to various groups and individuals in the community.33G States can use any method of prescribed
communication to notify community members ofthe presence of a convicted sex offender, such as posting the information online or in a public place in the community.337 Perhaps most disturbing is the fact
that many states fail to provide registrants with a right to appeal
their placement on the registry, the means of notification, and the
length of registration.338 While this type of legislation was drafted
and passed in response to tragic crimes that occurred in the 1980s and
1990s, the statutes in their current form no longer satisfy the original
legislative intent to protect communities from truly dangerous
criminals.

332. See id.
333. See Logan, supra note 328, at 1208.
334. See id.
335. See Karen Franklin, Vigilantes: Coming Soon to a Community Near You, IN
THE NEWS (Oct. 18, 2007), http://forensicpsychologist.blogspot.coml2007/10Ivigilanteism-coming-soon-to-community.html (referring to a vigilante in Maine and one in Bellingham, Washington, each of whom killed two sex offenders after getting their
addresses from a sex offender registry; a father and son in New Jersey mistakenly beating a man they thought was a paroled sex offender, whose name they had found pursuant to a community notification law; and a vigilante, later shot and killed by the police,
trying to break down the door of a sex offender whose name, photograph, and address
had been distributed to the neighborhood by the police); see also JENKINS, supra note 59,
at 201; Logan, supra note 328, at 1207 ("[Allthough notification is justified to protect the
public from registered [sex] offenders, it is clear that the broad scope of predicate offenses triggering registration and notification, including mere attempts to commit specified crimes, can overshoot this mark.").
336. Logan, supra note 328, at 1179.
337. [d. at 1203.
338. See id. at 1209.
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SUGGESTIONS FOR A NEW WAY TO APPROACH HOT
CRIMES

With an understanding both of what causes crimes to become hot
and how this social phenomenon impacts the manner in which such
crimes are handled or mishandled, we can now turn to suggestions for
preventing crimes from becoming hot and coping with the excesses
that result from them if they do.
A.

LEARN TO RECOGNIZE THE SYMPTOMS GIVEN OFF AS CRIMES ARE
BECOMING HOT

First, as a society, we need to recognize the existence of a hot
crime consistent with how this Article has defined one. 339 If society
begins to look with an informed eye at such crimes, we can identifY
those which are likely to result in excesses in the way they are perceived, prosecuted, and legislated. Specifically, the following can all be
signs that a crime is being hot: how these crimes have been misunderstood and treated historically, the presence of an especially heinous or
disastrous triggering criminal act or series of acts, the existence of
calls for extreme and unusual reactions from the public and the media, and responses from the courts and legislatures that are different
in kind or degree from how other crimes are treated. The ability to
recognize that a particular crime possesses elements that may lead to
excessive reactions will allow all aspects of society to act preemptively
at the early signs that such excesses are taking place.
As this Article has discussed, crimes related to driving while intoxicated had been traditionally regarded as minor by the public and
treated with undue leniency by the courts. 340 In part this was due to
the "there but for fortune go I" attitude about driving intoxicated.
When the public, with the assistance of groups such as Mothers
Against Drunk Driving ("MADD"), began to understand the dangers
that drunk drivers created and began to see the leniency with which
the courts punished such drivers, the reaction was a strong one. 341 In
time, what was an appropriately strong reaction became an inappropriately excessive one. 342
Crimes related to the sexual abuse of children were never taken
lightly, however, most people had little understanding of how often
they happened and even less understanding of how most child molesters were not the proverbial stranger in the long coat but instead a
339. See supra
340. See supra
341. See supra
342. See supra
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friend, acquaintance, or member of the family.343 Due to these misunderstandings and the inclination of many people to regard even discussing such things as taboo, child molestation crimes were
dramatically underreported. 344 In this historical under appreciation
of the seriousness or prevalence of a crime, we can see the seeds for
potential over-reaction once the various elements of society come to
recognize the problem in its full form.
Be it a spectacular arson fire at a Bronx social club, a series of
intensely reported and hyped up child sex abuse cases at daycare centers, or the calamitous events of 9/11, there is a real danger that such
tragic events could lead to societal over-reactions. The angrier people
are at criminal behavior, the more likely they will respond to it. 345
This is a good thing when it results in correcting the misunderstandings that led to such crimes being ignored or treated too leniently, but
not such a good thing when it casts suspicions on people merely because of who they are or what job they perform. 346 It is also not such a
good thing when it results in unnecessary and improperly suggestive
law enforcement procedures or draconian sentences that previously
were reserved for more serious crimes. 347
Burning down an empty warehouse is a serious crime. Should it
suddenly be treated more seriously than forcible rape or manslaughter? Has not society crossed the line in protecting children from abusers when day care providers are afraid to hug children in their care for
fear that someone will see them and claim they touched the children
improperly? Is even the most heinous act ever an excuse for the stereotyping of people based on their religion or appearance?
Major crimes need to be treated with the harshness warranted by
the deed, and where needed, laws should be drafted to make such
crimes more difficult to commit or to punish the lawbreaker proportionally to the seriousness of the crime. Yet we need to take special
care in such circumstances not to allow the crime of the moment to
rise to such a level that it silences the debate that normally accompanies the search to discover the best means of responding to crimes in
an effective yet measured way.
We need next to look at how the public is reacting to these crimes.
Is the media fueling public anger?348 Are organizations becoming
more and more strident and uncompromising in their attempts to
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.

See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
See generally supra Parts I, II.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra notes 106, 226, 321-27 and accompanying text.
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shed light on and combat the crimes?349 We must react to serious
crimes in meaningful and substantive ways, but there is no crime that
warrants the destruction of prized values such as fairness or constitutional principles involving the presumption of innocence, due process,
and the notion that a punishment should fit the crime.
Are draconian laws being passed, which not only cause unfair
sentences but which ironically make law enforcement less effective?350 When the seriousness of the drug problem and its relationship to other crimes was fully appreciated, tough laws were passed to
address drug related crimes. Some went too far, such as a New York
law that permitted the court to sentence a first offender who passed a
marijuana cigarette to another person to life imprisonment. 351 This
not only created a grossly unfair sentence scheme but also led the police, courts, and prosecutors to take steps to avoid enforcing the law as
written. 352 When courts are treating teenage boys past the age ofmajority who had sex with teenage girls like forcible rapists by sentencing them to substantial terms of imprisonment,353 it is clear that
courts have disregarded the important and sensible line drawing that
is designed to treat crimes proportionally to the extent of the moral
wrong and the degree of harm caused. Additionally, punishing someone convicted only of statutory rape like a forcible rapist devalues the
seriousness of a crime such as forcible rape. 354
349. See supra notes 143-54 and accompanying text.
350. See supra Part III.
351. See Judy Mann, Getting Wise to Stupid Drug Laws, WASH. POST, at C-9 (Mar.
30, 2001) (discussing the flaws in "New York's draconian Rockefeller drug laws, which
mandate[dl a 15-year-to-life sentence" for possessing or selling small amounts ofnarcotics, even for first time offenders).
352. See Austin Fenner, Prosecutors RIP Plan to Ease Drug Laws: Stiff Terms Nee·
essary, They Say, N.Y. DAlLY NEWS (Feb. 11, 2001). See generally Nancy S. Marder,
Juries, Drug Laws & Sentencing, 6 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 337, 360-62 (2002).
353. See, e.g., Meredith Cohen, No Child Left Behind Bars: The Need to Combat
Cruel and Unusual Punishment State Statutory Rape Laws, 16 J. L. & POL'y 717,717
(2008). Genarlow Wilson, a seventeen-year old with no prior criminal record, was convicted of aggravated child molestation and sentenced to a mandatory term of ten years
in prison without the possibility of parole when a fifteen-year-old girl consensually performed oral sex on him during a party. Id. at 717-18.
354. See Jessie K Liu, Victimhood, 71 Mo. L. REV. 115, 127-28 (2006) (arguing that
sentences should be proportional to the seriousness of the crime committed). The Supreme Court recognized the importance of not sentencing even especially heinous
criminals such as child rapists to a sentence that is disproportional to the crime committed. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008). While Kennedy was a death-penalty case and the Court's approach to just how disproportional a non-capital sentence
has to be to violate the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment
is somewhat murky, see, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983); Rummel v. Estelle, 445
U.S. 263 (1980), there should be no doubt that a sentence grossly disproportional to the
crime committed is unfair whether or not that unfairness rises to the level of a constitutional violation.
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AVOID OVER-

SENSATIONALIZING THE PROBLEM

It is no secret that numerous elements of the media thrive on sensationalizing crimes. 355 In a country that values freedom of the press,
that cannot be prevented. If not challenged, newspaper stories, Internet communications, and television segments serve to feed the fires
of over-reaction. Mechanisms must be put into place that quickly respond to these stories and that acknowledge the seriousness of the
crimes, but that also warn of the dangers of over-reaction and call into
question some of the outrageous claims that tend to accompany hot
crimes. Allegations, especially ones that seem too wild to be true,
often are untrue or at least highly exaggerated. 356 Common sense
should have told people immediately that some of the wild claims of
children abetted by therapists and law enforcement personnel in the
1980S357 were absurd, but the hysteria over child abuse drowned out
common sense.
There should be people writing op-ed pieces in newspapers, offering themselves as guests on television shows, responding in blogs and
on websites to some of the more outrageous claims made or at the
least insisting upon some verification for these claims. The message
sent should be that warning about excessive reactions to crimes does
not make the one who issues the warning weak or insensitive to the
damage done by the crime.
C.

CRAFT

LAws

RESPONSIVE TO THE CRIMES BUT THAT

Do

NOT

OVERREACH

There are times when, because the seriousness or prevalence of
certain crimes is underappreciated, laws need to be changed to respond to new information learned about such crimes. Science showed
that people posed a danger to other drivers and pedestrians when the
alcohol content of their blood was lower than had previously been believed. 358 Therefore lowering the blood alcohol level required to be
guilty of alcohol-related driving crimes to a level consistent with these
scientific findings made sense. Some states allow for punishing those
convicted of drunk driving by requiring ignition locks on their carsmeaning that before the drivers can start their cars, they must blow
355. Deborah W. Denno, Life Before the Modern Sex Offender Statutes, 92 Nw. U. L.
1317, 1384 (1998).
356. See supra Part III.B.
357. See generally Parts III.B, IV.
358. See supra notes 17-27 and accompanying text.
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into a machine that tests the alcohol content of their blood. 359 A reading above a certain amount will make the car impossible to start. 360
While laws such as these have their critics and can be excessive,
they do have one important feature that is important in avoiding certain over-reactions to hot crimes. Laws such as these target only individuals who have been found guilty of a crime or those whose conduct
is reasonably believed to be in violation of the law. Such a feature also
can contribute to the reasonableness and effectiveness oflaw enforcement approaches. For example, the practice employed by law enforcement personnel trained to observe the signs of drunk driving from
their cars while parked on the sides of roads has proven to be both an
effective and reasonable method of apprehending drunk drivers. 361
Sobriety checkpoints, on the other hand, have no such limitation
as they stop everyone, making no distinction for who mayor may not
be violating the law. 362 These stops, which are seizures and fall
within the protection of the Fourth Amendment, are made without
any suspicion that the person stopped may be intoxicated. 363 There
are certain Fourth Amendment searches and seizures that are acceptable without individualized suspicion because the appropriate governmental objectives can be achieved in no other reasonable way.364 This
Article has argued that drunk driving laws can be enforced in other
equally, if not more, effective ways.365 The normal ways of analyzing
the effectiveness of a governmental search or seizure done without the
existence of individualized suspicion (a necessary arialysis in determining the constitutionality of such Fourth Amendment implicated
activity) were largely abandoned by many courts, including the U.S.
Supreme Court, in assessing the constitutionality of these checkpoints. 366 There is good reason to believe this abandonment occurred
because drunk driving had become a hot crime.
359. See Press Release, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Ignition Interlocks Reduce Alcohol-Impaired Driving (Feb. 22,2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/
media/releasesl20111p0222_ignitioninterlocks.html.
360. [d.
361. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
362. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 74·76 and accompanying text.
364. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 647·48 (1995) (drug
testing of school athletes); Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 66768 (1989) (drug testing of customs service employees); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.
Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624, 631 (1989) (drug and alcohol testing of railroad employees);
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 1>43, 560-62 (1976) (border area inspections);
Camara v. Mun. Ct. of City & Cnty. ofS.F., 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967) (municipal housing
inspections).
365. See Press Release, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note 359
(study demonstrating effectiveness of interlock device); supra notes 107-42 and accompanying text.
366. See supra notes 107-42 and accompanying text.
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As new laws are proposed, care should be taken not to create severely longer sentences or criminalize behavior that was not previously considered criminal unless the existing laws contain significant
omissions or undervalue the seriousness of crime. The approach taken
by the New York State Legislature to the drug problem in the 1970s,
often referred to as the Rockefeller drug laws and discussed above,367
offers a concrete example of sentences made far too severe in reaction
to hot crimes.
Additionally, the laws or at least the application of them should
maintain meaningful distinctions between those offenders who deserve serious penalties and those who do not. While statutory rape
can be a crime deserving of substantial jail time in certain situations,
the push for tougher sentences for child sex abusers should riot lead to
ten-year prison sentences for consensual sex between teenagers368 or
provide a justification for placing such teens on a sex offender registry
list for the rest of their lives. 369
As new laws are created and existing laws are updated to reflect
the prevalence or seriousness of crimes that previously did not receive
the attention they deserved, we must be cognizant of the possible collateral consequences of such changes in laws. In crafting the laws,
lawmakers must be vigilant in guarding against allowing these laws
to apply to innocent people or allowing innocent activity to be
criminalized. Similarly, in their zeal to apprehend and prosecute
those who commit hot crimes, police and prosecutors must not abandon the checks and balances they normally apply before bringing
charges against criminal offenders. Of special concern is allowing
public pressure to coax police into using investigation and enforcement techniques that may not be scientifically or empirically defensible. 370 For prosecutors, the dangers lie in overlooking evidence that
may raise doubts about the guilt of an accused offender and in not
sufficiently assessing the credibility of both lay and expert
witnesses. 371

367. See supra notes 355-56 and accompanying text.
368. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 631 S.E.2d 391 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (affirming the
appellant's conviction for aggravated child molestation and mandatory lO-year imprisonment sentence).
369. See, e.g., People ex ret. Birkett v. Konetski, 909 N.E.2d 783 (Ill. 2009); In re
J.W., 787 N.E.2d 747 (TIl. 2003); In re T.C., 894 N.E.2d 876 (ill. App. Ct. 2008); In re
Welfare of J.R.Z., 648 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002); In re D.P., No. 2008-L-186,
2009 WL 4021187 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2009); In re Marcio A., No. 2007 CA 00149,
2008 WL 4118249 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2008).
370. See supra notes 285-320 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 275-77, 325-31 and accompanying text.
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The existing data demonstrates that although sobriety checkpoints are ineffective in dealing with drunk driving,372 states continue
to use them. The seizures at these checkpoints, which are permitted
despite the absence of individualized suspicion, raise serious constitutional concerns and clearly should not pass the U.S. Supreme Court's
own tests for Fourth Amendment legality.373 The investigations that
led to the prosecutions of day care facility workers for child sex abuse
relied on stories of children, which were often so bizarre that they
should have raised immediate red flags with police and prosecutors.374 These stories were supported by the testimony of child therapists whose suggestive methods in getting the stories from the
children were highly questionable and have now been largely
discredited. 375

D.

USE LIMITING RETRIBUTIVISM TO MODERATE EXCESSES OF
UTILITARIAN THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT

There are primarily four justifications for punishment, and
sentences in criminal cases invariably are based on one or more of
these justifications. The four justifications are retribution, deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation. Retribution is a morality based
concept which focuses on justice based principles. 376 The other three
justifications are utilitarian in nature, each seeking to reduce the likelihood that crimes will be committed in the future. 377 Through understanding these justifications for punishment and applying them
wisely, society can structure criminal penalties to avoid the excessive
sentences associated with hot crimes. To understand how this may be
accomplished, it is necessary to first understand the nature and purpose of each of the justifications for punishment.
Retribution seeks to salve the wound caused to society by the commission of a crime. 378 The way to salve this wound according to retributionists is to provide a punishment commensurate with the
372. See supra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
373. See supra notes 107-42 and accompanying text.
374. See supra Part III.B.
375. See supra notes 285-320 and accompanying text.
376. See generally HL.A. HART, PuNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 236 (1968); HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 9-10 (1968).
377. JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE AND THERAPY 151 (1979); PACKER,
supra note 376, at 10-11 (1968); LEON RADZINOWICZ, IDEOLOGY AND CRIME - A STUDY OF
CRIME IN ITS SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT 115 (1966).
378. The goal of punishment to the retributionist must be some form of righting the
wrong and not "the serpent wings of utilitarianism." C.L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PuNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION 159 (1987); NIGEL P. WALKER, WHY PuNISH? 7
(1991).
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seriousness of the crime committed. 379 Retributionists normally measure the seriousness of the crime by assessing the blameworthiness of
the wrongdoer and the degree of harm the crime caused. 380 The focus
of a retributionist sentence is the creation of a reasonably proportional
relationship between the seriousness of the crime and the harshness
of the sentence. The goals of most retributionists are limited to fairness and justice, without a strong concern for whether the sentence
will reduce crime in the future. 381 To many retributionists, it is wrong
to use a person, even one guilty of a crime, to achieve societal goals,
especially if those goals compromise fairness. 382
There are two forms of deterrence: general deterrence and special
or specific deterrence. 383 Deterrence based sentences are designed to
make the punishment harsh enough that those contemplating committing a similar crime in the future will get the message that the
benefit the potential wrongdoer hopes to gain through the crime is
outweighed by the punishment he will suffer if caught and convicted. 384 General deterrence is designed to use the sentence in a
given case to send the message to the public at large,385 while specific
or special deterrence aims the message at the defendant. 386 In each
case, the focus is not on creating a sentence that is fair because it is
proportional to the crime committed but the focus is on reducing future crime. 387 The justification is utilitarian in nature. 388
The purpose of sentences with the primary justification of incapacitation is to insure that the individual who committed the crime is
379. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR fuTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 31 (1985).
380. [d. at 64; Thomas E. Baker & Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr., Eighth Amendment

Challenges to the Length of a Criminal Sentence: Following the Supreme Court "From
Precedent to Precedent," 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 25, 69 (1985).
381. See, e.g., C.S. LEWIS, THE HUMANITARIAN THEORY OF PuNISHMENT, reprinted in
CONTEMPORARY PuNISHMENT: VIEWS, EXPLANATIONS, AND JUSTIFICATIONS 194 (Rudolph
J. Gerber & Patrick D. McAnany eds., 1972) ("[T]he concept of desert is the only connecting link between punishment and justice.").
382. Immanuel Kant believed that "one man ought never to be dealt with as a
means subservient to the purpose of another." IMMANUEL KANT, JUSTICE AND Punishment, reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES OF PuNISHMENT 103, 104 (Gertrude
Ezorsky ed., 1972); see also LEWIS, supra note 381, at 195.
383. NICHOLAS N. Kl'ITRIE & ELYCE H. ZENOFF, SANCTIONS, SENTENCING, AND CORRECTIONS: LAw, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 12 (1981); PACKER, supra note 376, at 39.
384. PACKER, supra note 376, at 140; RAnZINowICZ, supra note 377, at 10-11; VON
HIRSCH, supra note 379, at 32.
385. KrTTRIE & ZENOFF, supra note 383, at 12; PACKER, supra note 376, at 39; see
also United States v. Blarek, 7 F. Supp. 2d 192, 202 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (discussing Jeremy
Bentham's espousal of general deterrence).
386. PACKER, supra note 376, at 45.
387. [d. at II.
388. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PuNISHMENTS 45 (1976);
see TEN, supra note 378, at 7-8.
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separated from the public so he will no longer pose a danger.389 Incapacitation based sentences are generally reserved for the most heinous of criminals like serial murderers or child rapists. The goal of
such a sentence is to separate the dangerous individual from his potential victims. 390 While this often means that the most serious
crimes are punished most severely, as in a retribution based sentence,
this is not the goal of the incapacitationist. Therefore, a defendant can
be punished more harshly than the crime he committed might call for
because he is deemed to pose a danger to society due to the perceived
likelihood that he will commit similar acts in the future. 391 With its
eye on preventing the criminal from endangering others in the future,
incapacitation is also a utilitarian sentence justification.
Rehabilitation as a sentencing justification is not to be confused
with the programs both within and outside penal institutions that are
designed to help an offender overcome whatever problem led him to
criminal behavior. Programs that provide counseling, education, or vocational training designed to aid the offender in leading a crime-free
life in the future may be the tools employed for a rehabilitation based
sentence. As a sentencing justification, however, rehabilitation refers
to crafting a sentence, including the length of any incarceration, conditioned on how long it will take the offender to free himself from
whatever led him to commit crimes. 392 In crafting such a sentence, the
importance of the seriousness of the crime is minimal in comparison to
an assessment of what and how much time the offender will need to
change sufficiently so that he will not re-offend. 393 Rehabilitation,
with its focus on changing the offender rather than making the sentence proportional to the crime, is another utilitarian sentencing
justification.
Understandably, judges often wish to accomplish something they
regard as meaningful when sentencing criminals. At times, the primary purpose of a sentence is to help the offender deal with the perceived problem that led him to commit the criminal act. Sometimes,
the sentencing judge wishes to separate the dangerous offender from
the rest of society. At other times, it is clear that the judge's goal is
use the sentence to send a message either to the defendant or poten389. TEN, supra note 378, at 8.
390. KI'l'TRIE & ZENOFF, supra note 383, at 13.
391. VON HIRSCH, supra note 379, at 24; see also KI'ITRIE & ZENOFF, supra note 383,
at 24.
392. KI'l'TRIE & ZENOFF, supra note 383, at 11, 23.
393. See Craig Peyton Gaumer, Punishment for Prejudice: A Commentary on the
Constitutionality and Utility of State Statutory Responses to the Problems of Hate
Crimes, 39 S.D. L. REV. 1, 42 & n.239 (1994).
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tial future offenders about the price they will pay for committing a
similar crime. All of these utilitarian goals are laudable.
The more a sentence reflects utilitarian principles, however, the
more likely it is to skew the proportionality of the relationship between the seriousness of the crime and the harshness of the punishment. 394 Retributionists believe that sentencing defendants to more
or less time than they "deserve" (meaning the seriousness of the crime
they committed) is unjust. 395 Due to the attention hot crimes get from
the public and politicians, it would be na'ive to expect judges to ignore
the pressure that builds on them in sentencing defendants who have
been convicted of hot crimes. The press and watchdog groups often
make the public aware of sentences in such cases. In most instances,
the pressure in such cases is to sentence those convicted of hot crimes
to heavy sentences. Therefore, with hot crimes the temptation to base
a sentence primarily on utilitarian principles and impose a heavier
sentence than one that fits the particular crime committed is likely to
be especially intense. AI:, a result, harsh sentences may be meted out
for such crimes to first offenders or in situations where the facts or
circumstances mitigate the seriousness of the offense.
As judges will often use utilitarian principles in sentencing defendants for hot crimes and, as the use of such principles may be appropriate, it would be unwise as well as ineffective to attempt to
eliminate such sentencing. On the other hand, because the use of
these principles can result in sentences that may be totally disproportionate to the seriousness of the crime committed, they can result in
gross unfairness. The solution to this problem is to employ the principles of limiting retributivism.
Limiting retributivism allows judges to include whatever utilitarian goal they deem appropriate in determining the proper sentence
394. In the acerbic words of C.8. Lewis,
Only the expert penologist . . . in the light of previous experiment, can tell is
what is likely to deter: only the psychotherapist can tell us what is likely to
cure. It will be in vain for the rest of us, speaking simply as men, to say, 'but
this punishment is hideously unjust, hideously disproportionate to the criminal's deserts. The experts with perfect logic will reply "but nobody was talking
about deserts." No one was talking about punishment in your archaic vindictive sense of the word. Here are the statistics proving the treatment deters.
Here are the statistics proving that this other treatment cures. What is your
trouble?
C.S. LEWIS, supra note 381, at 196. SEE ALSO WALKER, supra note 275, at 67.
395. Herbert Morris suggests that the wrongfulness of basing punishment on
achieving utilitarian ends is apparent when looking at a person who would be sentenced
despite being innocent of any crime. Even if deterrence or some other utilitarian goal
were achieved through the sentence, it would still be unjust. HERBERT MORRIS, PERSONS
AND PuNISHMENT, reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PuNISHMENT, supra
note 382, at 121. See generally NORVAL MORRIS, THE FuTuRE OF IMPRISONMENT 75
(1972); MURPHY, supra note 377, at 234.
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for a criminal offender. At the end of the day, though, the judge must
review the sentence to decide if the use of utilitarian factors has so
skewed the relationship between the crime and the punishment that
the resulting sentence is grossly unfair. 396 Norval Morris, a strong believer in making sentences proportional to crimes, wrote that just desert is not a defining principle but a limiting one. 397 Another
commentator described the benefit of limiting retributivism stating,
"[C]onsiderations of justice function as checks on social utility, weighing against promoting happiness if in so doing people are treated
unfairly. "398
When dealing with hot crimes, the primary dangers of which are
excesses in many forms, use of the principle of limiting retributivism
would be especially valuable. Limiting retributivism would allow a
judge to consider the importance of rehabilitation, incapacitation, and!
or deterrence in his or her sentence while protecting against the kind
of unjust sentences that lose sight ofthe relationship between the seriousness of the crime itself and the harshness of the punishment. 399
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Article explored the phenomenon of the hot crime. Primarily
using child sex abuse and alcohol related driving offenses as examples, this Article traced the path and trajectory of such crimes. Only
by understanding what causes certain crimes to become hot, the kinds
of excessive responses that hot crimes provoke, and the resulting societal impact from these responses, can we hope to avoid these types of
over-reaction. As societal responses to hot crimes reflect somewhat
natural human behavior, there is no foolproof way to prevent the
harmful excesses that hot crimes can produce. There are, however,
steps that can be taken to reduce the possibility of a crime becoming
hot and to diminish the harmful effects should the crime take on such
characteristics.
First, we need to recognize the symptoms that are indicative of a
crime becoming hot. There needs to be effective mechanisms in existence for challenging the media and the public who exaggerate the
dangers or prevalence of certain crimes or call for extreme responses
396. WALKER, supra note 275, at 127. While H.L. Packer believes that prevention or
deterrence is the chief goal of the criminal law, he recognizes that blameworthiness
(retribution) must act as a limiting principle. PACKER, supra note 376, at 66.
397. NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 199 (1982).
398. MuRPHY, supra note 377, at 150.
399. In this regard, the United States Supreme Court wrote in a recent case, "Even
if the punishment has some connection to a valid penological goal, it must be shown that
the punishment is not grossly disproportionate in light of the justification offered." Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2029 (2010).
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to them. Public officials may need to change old laws or craft new
ones to respond adequately to what is newly learned about certain
crimes, but those laws should not overreach or have deleterious collateral consequences. Courts should not abandon traditional approaches
to the interpretation of constitutional rights when dealing with such
crimes. Finally, when sentencing persons convicted of crimes, especially hot crimes, judges should employ the principles of limiting retributivism to insure that the relationship between crime and
punishment is not grossly disproportional.

